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TAX SHELTERS: The New Compliance Environment *
D. French Slaughter In
1. Introductio&
Despite continuing legislation by Congress and efforts on the part of the
Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Treasury to regulate tax
shelter investments and monitor taxpayer compliance in this area, tax shelters
continued to proliferate through the 1970's and into the 1980's.1 While cer-
tainly the great majority of what can be described as tax shelter investments
are legitimate and comply in all material respects with the internal revenue
laws, it is equally clear that a substantial subset of tax shelter offerings are
arrangements and planning techniques whose compliance with the internal
revenue laws ranges between colorable and illusory.2 It is this segment of the
tax shelter industry that created a crisis of unprecedented proportions in
administration of the internal law which triggered in turn the legislative
response of TEFRA.3
* This paper is based upon a chapter written by D. French Slaughter, lfor A Practical Guide
to Tax Shelter Litigation by Edward Brodsky. Copywright 1982, Law Journal Seminars-Press,
111 Eighth Avenue, New York, New York 10011.
I See generally, D. French Slaughter, III, The Empire Strikes Back Injunctions of Abusive
Tax Shelters After TEFRA, 3 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 2-8 (1983); Paul J. Sax, Lawyer Responsibility in
Tax Shelter Opinions, 34 Tax Law 5, 6-16 (1980).
2 Cf., Andre Le Duc, The Legislative Response of the 97th Congress to Tax Shelters, the Audit
Lottery, and Other Forms of Intentional or Reckless Noncompliance, Tax Notes 363 (Jan 31,
1983). One commentator has suggested the reason for the growth of abusive tax shelters:
In earlier years promoted tax benefits could be obtained with a
high degree of assurance and often were used to enhance the
marketability of an otherwise sensible investment. What abuse
there was lay in the exaggerating effect of leverage which magni-
fied the tax benefits of deductions that had been intended by
Congress. But after the 1970's legislation neither leverage nor
deductions could be readily obtained with the same high assu-
rance of success. Instead, promoters were compelled to turn to
more esoteric investments, often structured solely for tax benefits,
usually unintended by Congress. Their result frequently was
promotion and sale of a device with only marginal prospects for
success, at least apart from the chance to avoid detection in the
lottery of audit selection.
Sax, supra at 11. See also Testimony of Roscoe L. Egger, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to
the House Ways and Means Committee on Oversight (Sept. 28, 1982) reprinted in Tax Notes,
65, 65-68 (Oct. 4, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Egger Testimony].
3 For example, as of September 30, 1982, the Internal Revenue Service had under examina-
tion 284,828 returns with tax shelter issues, an increase of 36,000 returns of this type for the
prior fiscal year. See 1982 Annual Report of the Commissioner and the Chief Counsel of the
Internal Revenue Service 11 [hereafter cited as 1982 Annual Report]. See also S. Rep. No. 494,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 266, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Cong. & Adm. News 781, 1014-17 [hereafter
cited as 1982 Senate Report]. As of September 30, 1982, returns under audit with tax shelter
issues amounted to more than 20 percent of all returns under audit by the Internal Revenue
Service in which adjustments were proposed, an increase of 25 percent from the prior fiscal year.
See 1982 Annual Report, supra, at 11, 56 (table 11). Approximately one third of the cases
pending before the United States Tax Court involve tax shelters. See Statement of Former Chief
Judge Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., United States Tax Court, to the Senate Finance Subcommittee
on Oversight of the Internal Revenue Service (June 24, 1983).
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The primary focus of the compliance provisions of the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 19824 ("TEFRA"), was so-called "abusive tax
shelters" and the problem of growing taxpayer noncompliance with the
internal revenue laws facilitated by such shelters.' The penalty provisions of
TEFRA6 and the related abusive tax shelter injunction statute7 were enacted
by Congress to provide the Internal Revenue Service with better enforcement
tools to deal with the problem of abusive tax shelters.' The Tax Reform Act
of 1984 ("1984 Tax Reform Act") enacted additional provisions to assist the
Service in policing tax shelters.8a The purpose of this chapter is to examine
these recent legislative changes with emphasis on the practical aspects of their
application.
Prior to TEFRA, the Internal Revenue Service could only respond to most
tax shelter abuses by auditing the investor's return and disallowing the
improper deductions or credits claimed. This situation clearly favored the
investor.9 In the event the investor's return came up for audit and claimed tax
4 Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.
5 See generally Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., Report on Tax
Shelters 2 (Com. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 J. Com. Staff Report], reprinted in Daily
Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 123, at J-17 (June 24, 1983). Various definitions of "abusive tax shelters"
have been suggested. One commentator defines an abusive tax shelter as "a transaction or arran-
gement that involves claimed tax benefits that have an extremely low probability of being
realized." LeDuc, supra at 365 n. 13 (Jan. 31, 1983). That definition corresponds to the implied
definition of abusive tax shelters under Section 6700 of the Internal Revenue Code. See infra.
The Internal Revenue Manual defines an abusive tax shelter as "one that lacks economic realty
or viability when viewed in its entirety" and that is characterized by inflated appraisals, unrealis-
tic allocations, or similar devices used to increase the claimed tax benefits. Int. Rev. Manual-
Examination Tax Shelters Handbook, I.R.S. No. 4236, ch. 361 (1979), reprinted in [Index Vol.]
Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 300 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Examination Tax Shelters
Handbook].
6 The substantial understatement penalty, Section 6661 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
(26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter "Code"], the penalty for promotion of abusive tax shelters, Code Section
6700; and the penalty for aiding and abetting the improper avoidance of tax, Code Section 6701.
See generally, infra.
7 Code Section 7408. See generally, infra
8 In addition, also included in TEFRA was a new penalty for filing frivolous returns, Code
Section 6702; an increased penalty for failure to supply taxpayer identification number, Code
Section 6676(a); provisions for additional interest for civil fraud penalties, Code Section 6653(b)
(2); and increased penalties for failure to file certain information returns, Code Section 6652.
sa Pub. L. No. 98- , Stat. . See generally S. Prt. 98-169, Committee on Finance, 98th
Cong. 2d Sess., Explanation of Provisions Approved by the Committee on March 21, 1984
(Com. Print 1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 Sen. Rep.]; House Rep. 4170, Tax Reform Act of
1983, 98th Cong., 1st Seas. (Com. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 H. Rep.]; House Rep.
4170, Tax Reform Act of 1984, Supplemental Report, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. (Com Print 1984)
[hereinafter cited as 1984 House Rep.]; Conference Report 17.R. 4170 (June 22, 1984) [here-
inafter cited as 1984 Conf. Rep.]. With a few notable exceptions, the provisions of the Tax
Reform Act directed at tax shelters are primarily substantive in nature as opposed to compliance
oriented. Those provisions directly affecting tax shelter compliance include the requirement for
registration of tax shelters, new Code Sections 6707 and 6111; requirement that promoters
maintain lists of their tax shelter investors, new Code Sections 6708 and 6112; amendment of
the injunction statute, Code Section 7408, to include fraudulent aiding and abetting conduct
under § 6701 as a proper ground for injunction, Act. Sec. 143, and increasing the promoter
penalty under Code Section 6700. See Act Sec. 143.
9 Moreover, except in rare instances where criminal prosecution was possible, the Government
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shelter deductions or credits disallowed, the Government was merely making
a low-interest loan to the errant investor because the interest rate on any
resulting tax deficiency was substantially below the market rate of interest.10
The only credible risk to the investor was imposition of the negligence
penalty (5 percent of the tax underpaid) or civil fraud penalty (50 percent)
but neither penalty could be successfully imposed by the IRS as long as the
investor could articulate a "reasonable basis" for the claimed but disallowed
deduction or credit." Thus, taxpayers had little inducement to select conser-
vative tax shelter investments or concede if audited, and every reason to take
agressive positions with the prospect of either avoiding detection altogether
or, if caught, paying off the deficiency at favorable interest rates.12
Recognizing that this system favored-indeed encouraged-noncom-
pliance, Congress in enacting TEFRA introduced a new strategy with specific
emphasis on dealing directly with abusive tax shelters.' 3 With the TEFRA
and 1984 Tax Reform Act legislation the Internal Revenue Service may now
impose substantial penalties on taxpayers whose claims fail to meet certain
minimum standards of justification, with an even stricter standard of com-
pliance imposed in the case of "tax shelter" claims;' 4 enjoin with court
approval the promotion of "abusive tax shelters; 5 and penalize culpable third
parties who assist taxpayers in tax avoidance.' 6
had no recourse at all against the promoter of a shelter whose tax benefits could not survive
audit scrutiny.
10 Of course, if the IRS failed to audit of the return, the investor escaped all liability. He had
won the "audit lottery" The ability of the IRS to detect questionable returns has been substan-
tially increased in recent years by automation of return processing and selection of returns for
examination. 1982 Annual Report, supra.
It Code Section 6653. See e.g., Durovic v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1364 (1970), aff'd 487 F.
2d 26 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 417 U.S. 915 (1974); Michael I. Saltzman, IRS Practice and
Procedure, 7-73 to 7-75 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont) (1981) [hereinafter Saltzman].
12 See generally Stuart E. Siegel, New Penalty Provisions - Some Practical Considerations, 61
Taxes 788, 789 (Dec. 1983). Even the recent amendment to Code Section 6621(c) by the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 ("ERTA") setting the interest rate for tax deficiencies at
100 percent of the rate for Government securities may be of limited effect for taxpayers who
may otherwise borrow at higher rates.
13 See 1982 Senate Report at 266, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News at 1014;
George R. Sokoly and Charles D. Miner, The Continuing Attack against Abusive Tax Shelters
and Questionable Reporting Positions, 62 Mich. Bar. J. 33 (1983); LeDuc, supra.
14 Code Section 6661 (substantial understatement penalty). See Section III, A., infra.
Is Code Section 7408 (injunction of abusive tax shelters). See Section II. B., infra.
16 Code Section 6700 (abusive tax shelter promoter penalty); Code Section 6701 (aiding and
abetting penalty). See Sections I1. A. and Ill. B., infra.
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II. TEFRA and Abusive Tax Shelters
As the legislative history indicates,' Congress added sections 6700 and
7408 to the Code to reduce the onerous burden abusive tax shelters place on
the federal tax system.2 Section 6700 subjects tax shelter promoters, salesmen,
and those who assist them to penalties for organizing or selling abusive tax
shelters. 3 Section 7408 complements the promoter penalty by authorizing the
government to institute an action in federal district court, to "enjoin any
person from further engaging in conduct subject to penalty under section
6700."4
A. The Promotor Penalty - Section 6700
1. Generally
Section 67005 penalizes two types of statements: a statement with respect
to the securing of any tax benefit which the person penalized knows or has
reason to know if false or fraudulent as to any material matter, or a "gross
ISee TEFRA, § 321, 96 Stat. at 612; 1982 Senate Report, at 266-69, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad News at 1014-17; H.R. Rep. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 572-73, reprinted
in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1190, 1344-45 [hereinafter cited as 1982 Conference
Report].
2 The Senate Finance Committee described the problem as follows: "The widespread market-
ing and use of tax shelters undermines public confidence inthe fiarness of the tax system and in
the effectiveness of existing enforcement provisions. These tax schemes place a disproportionate
burden on the Internal Revenue Service resources." 1982 Senate Report, supra note 14, at 266,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1014. One commentator described the
import of the TEFRA legislation:
TEFRA does not follow the past strategy of changing the under-
lying substantive rules. Rather it restructures the calculus of
investors, promoters, and their advisors with respect to tax bene-
fits that are problematic or uncertain, reducing the appeal of shel-
ters that offer such benefits.
LeDuc, supra at 369. See also Holden, "Treasury Wages War on Abusive Tax Shelters", Legal
Times, Oct. 25, 1982, at 11.
3 The Senate Finance Committee wrote: "The committee believes that the penalty provisions
of present law are ineffective to deal with the growing phenomenon of abusive tax shelters.
Abusive tax shelters must be attacked at their source: the organizer and salesman." 1982 Senate
Report, at 266, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1013. See also 1982 Confer-
ence Report, at 572, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1344.
4 See Code Section 7408(a). Because suit for injunctive relief under § 7408 is brought in
federal district court, the Tax Division of the U.S. Department of Justice actually litigate the
injunction cases on behalf of the Internal Revenue Service in coordination with the United States
Attorney in the district where the action is brought. See infra Section II B. However, the pros-
pective defendants are initially identified by the Service which, at the appropriate stage of its
investigation, refers the matter to the Department of Justice for institution of suit. See infra
Section II. C. See Int. Rev. Manual-II Audit (CCH) § 4565.43 (1981); Code Section 7701(a)
(12) (A) (ii); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-9.
5 Code Section 6700 provides:
SEC. 6700. PROMOTING ABUSIVE TAX SHELTERS, ETC.
(a) Imposition of Penalty.-Any person who-
(1)(A) organizes (or assists in the organization of)-
(i) a partnership or other entity,
(ii) any investment plan or arrangement, or
(iii) any other plan or arrangement, or
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valuation overstatement" as to any material matter.6 A gross valuation over-
statement is the valuation of property or services at more than 200 percent of
its correct value.7
2. Scope of the Penalty
The Section 6700 penalty applies to any person who makes or furnishes
the proscribed statements in connection with the organization or sale of "a
partnership or other entity, any investment plan or arrangement or any plan
or arrangement." 8 Persons subject to penalty under section 6700 include not
only the actual promoter or syndicator who organizes the tax shelter but also
those who "assist in the organization of" or "participate in the sale of any
(B) participates in the sale of any interest in an entity or plan or arrangement referred to
in subparagraph (A), and
(2) makes or furnishes (in connection with such organization or sale)-
(A) a statement with respect to the allowability of any deduction or credit, the excludabil-
ity of any income, or the securing of anyother tax benefit by reason of holding an interest in the
entity or participating in the plan or arrangement which the person knows or has reason to know
is false or fraudulent as to any material matter, or
(B) a gross valuation overstatement as to any material matter, shall pay a penalty equal to
the greater of $1,000 or 20 percent of the gross income derived or to be derived by such person
from such activity.
(b) Rules Relating to Penalty for Gross Valuation Overstatements
(1) Gross valuation overstatement defined.-For purposes of this section, the term "gross
valuation overstatement" means any statement as to the value of any property or services if-
(A) the value so stated exceeds 200 percent of the amount determined to be the correct
valuation, and
(B) the value of such property or services is directly related to the amount of any deduc-
tion or credit allowable under chapter I to any participant.
(2) Authority to waive.-The Secretary may waive all or part of the penalty provided by
subsection (a) with respect to any gross valuation overstatement on a showing that there was a
reasonable basis for the valuation and that such valuation was made in good faith.
(c) Penalty in Addition to Other Penalties.-The penalty imposed by this section shall be in
addition to any other penalty provided by law.
6 See Code Section 6700(a) (2). The penalty is "the greater of $1,000 or 20 percent of the
gross income derived or to be derived by such person from such activity." Code Section 6700(a).
See Section III.B.[3], infra.
7 See Code Section 6700(a) (2) (B) and (b) (1).
8 See Code Section 6700(a) (1). The statute does not define "tax shelters." Rather, it enumer-
ates in broad brush a class of entities subject to the statute: "(i) a partnership or other entity,
(ii) any investment plan or arrangement, or (iii) any other plan or arrangement." Code Sec-
tion 6700(a) (1) (A). Hence, the statute is not limited to conventional tax shelter investments but
is equally applicable to such abusive tax avoidance schemes as mail order ministries and family
trusts. See Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess., General Explanation
of the Revenue Provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 at 211
(Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Joint Comm. Explanation]. Indeed, it appears
that the great bulk of litigation under Sections 6700 and 7408 has involved such schemes. See
e.g., United States Y. Hutchinson, 83-1 U.S. para. 9322 (S.D. Cal. 1983) (family trust promoter
enjoined under § 7408); United States v. Buttorff, 563 F. Supp. 450 (N.D. Tex. 1983) United
States v. Jones, 53 A.F.T.R. 2d 84-370, 83-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9741 (N.D. Tex 1983); United
States v. White, 84-1 U.S.T.C. para. 9441 (D. Minn. May 1, 1984). Cf. Code Section 6661
(defining "tax shelter," for purposes of the substantial understatement penalty, as any entity, plan
or arrangement where the "principal purpose" is tax avoidance or evasion). See Section IHLA,
infra.
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interest in" the shelter.9 Thus professional advisors such as attorneys and
accountants who furnish opinions, draft offering documents or compile pro-
jections come within the class of persons subject to statute.' 0 The variety of
persons potentially subject to penalty under section 6700 is amply demon-
strated by the types of defendants named by the Department of Justice in
abusive tax shelter injunction suits filed to date." Those named in injunction
suits have included attorneys, 12 accountants,13 appraisers 4 and salesmen. 5
3. Amount of Penalty
Code Section 6700(a) specifies that the penalty for engaging conduct sub-
ject to penalty under Section 6700 shall be "the greater of $1,000 or 20
percent of the gross income derived or to be derived by [the penalized] person
from such activity"' 6
The legislative history provides little guidance for calculating the "gross
income derived or to be derived" for purposes of the § 6700 penalty. 7 The
use of "gross income" rather than net income or other measure of actual
profits suggests that the penalty should be determined without reference to
the out-of-pocket expenses and other costs of the person penalized. 8 The
9 Code Section 6700(a) (1).
10 See 1982 Senate Report at 266, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1014;
1982 Joint Comm. Explanation at 211. Compare E. Brodsky, ch. 13. Indeed the legislative
history also appears to construe the penalty, and in turn the injunction remedy, as extending even
to the advisor whose only role may have been advising a single client:
Thus, persons subject to the penalty may include not only the
promoter of a classic tax shelter partnership or tax avoidance
scheme, but any other person who organizes or sells a plan or
arrangement with respect to which there are material inacuracies
affecting the tax benefits to be derived from participation in the
arrangement. For example, the penalty could apply to someone
organizing or selling an investment to or for a particular client.
1982 Joint Comm. Explanation, at 211 (emphasis supplied).
" Code Section 7408 allows the Government to seek a court ordered injunction to enjoin
further promotion of abusive tax shelters upon a showing that the defendants to be enjoined have
engaged in conduct subject to penalty under Section 6700 and that injunctive relief is otherwise
appropriate. See, Section II.B infra.
12 See, E.G., United States v. Packaging Industries, Group Inc., No. 83-2307-N (D. Mass.
Aug. 8, 1983) (defendants, including attorney, consent to entry of injunction without admitting
or denying allegations of Government's complaint).
13 See, e.g., United States v. North American Investment Group, No. 84-C-3683 (N.D. Ill.
Government complaint filed Apr. 30, 1984).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Music Masters Ltd, No. C-C-84-228-P (W.D. N.C. Government
complaint filed May 2, 1984).
'5 See, e.g., United States v. Wachter, No. 84-0883-C(2) (E.D. Mo. Government complaint
filed Apr. 16, 1984).
16 Code Section 6700(a). TEFRA provided that the penalty was to be $1,000 or 10% of gross
income. TEFRA § 320. The percentage amount was increased to 20% by the Tax Reform Act of
1984. TRA § 143. See 1984 Conf. Rep. at 227.
17 See 1982 Senate Report, at 267, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1015.
11 However, some preliminary pronouncements by Government officials indicate that the
penalty may be calculated based on gross receipts less cost of goods sold. See Remarks of
Carolyn M. Parr, Special Counsel/Acting Chief, Office of Special Litigation, Tax Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, to ABA Section of Taxation Winter Meeting, Las Vegas, Nevada (Feb.
11, 1984).
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legislative history suggests that the penalty should include the present value of
all future payments which the penalized party "reasonably expects" to
receive, such as future payments of debt service.' 9
4. Conduct Subject to Penalty
a. Generally
Whether the subject conduct at issue is that of false or fraudulent statement
or gross valuation overstatement, three elements are common to both types of
statements. Regardless of whether the actionable statement is a false or
fraudulent statement or a gross valuation overstatement, there must be a
"statement." 20 Second, the statement must be "made or furnished" in connec-
tion with the organization or sale of the tax shelter. 2' Third, both grounds of
culpability require a showing that the statement is a material one.22
The statement requirement of section 6700(a) (2) presents few interpreta-
tive problems. Oral as well as written statements have been held actionable
under Code Section 6700.23 An omission, however, would appear to be out-
side the scope of the penalty provision.24
The "makes or furnishes" requirement raises the question of whether a
prospective defendent who is an integral party to the tax shelter arrangement
is liable under the statute if he does not directly make or furnish the actiona-
ble statement. Read literally, the statute appears not to impose liability on
such a defendant. On the other hand, such a result would conflict with the
broad remedial purpose expressed in the legislative history.25 Such a literal
'9 See 1982 Senate Report at 267. The Joint Committee Explanation states:
If the Internal Revenue Service cannot determine the entire
amount of the gross income to be derived from an activity it may
assess the penalty on the present value of the portion of such
gross income that may be determined. In determining the penalty
with respect to the amount of gross income yet to be derived
from an activity, the Secretary may look only to unrealized
amounts which the promoter or other person may reasonably
expect to realize.
Joint Comm. Explanation at 212. But compare United States v. Packaging Indus. Group, Inc.,
No. 83-2307-N (D. Mass. 1983) (consent decree) (defendant consented without admitting or
denying Government allegations to pay a § 6700 penalty of $45 1,100- 10% of the cash portion
of the purchase price it received from the sale of the tax shelter asset in question).
20 See Code Section 6700(a) (2).
21 See id.
2 Code Section 6700 proscribes a statement with respect to tax benefits which the prospective
defendant "knows or has reason to know is false or fraudulent as to any material matter," or
alternatively, "a gross valuation overstatement as to any material matter." Id. (emphasis added).
23 Cf., United States Y. White, 84-1 U.S.T.C. para, 9441 (D. Minn. May 1, 1984); United
States v. Buttoroff, 563 F. Supp. 450 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
24 See Code Section 6700(a) (2). In contrast, an omission is expressly actionable under the
securities law. Compare 15 U.S.C. 771(2) (1976) with Code Section 6700(a) (2).
25 See 1982 Senate Report, at 266-69, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
1014-17; 1982 Conference Report, at 572-73, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
at 1344-45. Cf., In re Caesars Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(persons who aid and abet a violation of § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 can be liable);
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680-81 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (Same,
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reading would allow culpable persons to circumvent the statutory framework
by the use of alter-ego entities to make or furnish the actionable statements.
A more logical construction consistent with the legislative history would sub-
ject a person to penalty by virtue of taking an integral part in aiding and
abetting the shelter's organization and promotion, and regardless of whether
participation in the actual making or furnishing of the actionable statements
was direct or indirect.26
It appears Congress recognized the limitations imposed by the "making or
furnishing" element when it added conduct subject to penalty under Code
Section 6701 (penalty for aiding and abetting understatement of tax liability)
as actionable conduct under Section 7408.26a
In defining materiality, the legislative history of section 6700 tracks the
definition of material under the securities law: "[a] matter is material to the
arrangement if it would have a substantial impact on the decision-making
process of a reasonably prudent investor." 27 However, neither reliance by the
purchasing taxpayer or actual unreporting of tax is required to establish
materiality under Section 6700.28
b. False or Fraudulent Statement
To establish grounds for the penalty under Section 6700 based on "false or
fraudulent" statement, the Government must demonstrate that the person to
be penalized know or had "reason to know" of the alleged false or fraudulent
statement. 29 The "knows or has reason to know" phrasing is not entirely new
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 982 (1970).
26 Under the securities laws, persons indirectly participating in violations have been liable or
subject to enforcement action as aiders and abettors, under theories of conspiracy, or by expan-
sive definitions of what constitutes a "seller" for purposes of the securities laws. See generally
Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In
Pari Delicto, Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 597 (1972). See also Annot.,
56 A.L.R. Fed. 659 (1982).26a 1984 Tax Reform Act § 143. See 1984 Conf. Rep. at 227; 1984 Sen. Rep. at 434-435.
27 1982 Senate Report, at 267, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1015. Cf.,
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (omitted fact deemed material
if there is a substantial likelihood that the omitted fact's disclosure would be viewed by a reaso-
nable shareholder as important in deciding how to vote). Compare the more objective definition
in ABA Revised Opinion 346, (materiality defined as "any income or excise tax issue relating to
the tax shelter that would have a significant effect in sheltering from federal taxes income from
other sources by providing deductions in excess of the income from the tax shelter investment in
any year"). See also Final Rule, Treasury Department Circular 230, 49 Fed. Reg. 6719 (Feb. 23,
1984).
28 See 1982 Senate Report, at 267, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1015;
1982 Joint Comm. Explanation, at 212. Accord United States v. Rayor, 204 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.
(al. 1962) (court held false statement to be material under Code Section 7206(1) even though
convicted taxpayer had actually overpaid tax due for the year at issue). See also United States v.
Nu.., 415 F 2d 1178, 1181 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v. Baker, 262 F. Supp. 657, 682
(D.D.C. 1966). Cf., Code Section 7207 (willful delivery or disclosure to the Service of any
information known to be false as to any material matter is a misdemeanor); 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(1976) (knowing and willful falsification or concealment of material facts or false, fictitious or
fraudulent statements to any federal department or agency is a felony).
29 Code Section 6700(a) (2) (A). The "reason to know" language was not reflected in the
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to the Code.30
While the inclusion of the "reason to know" standard relaxes somewhat
the Government's burden of proving scienter as to a false or fraudulent
statement, the legislative history is careful to point out that the language
should not be viewed as imposing upon a defendant a duty of inquiry
"beyond the level of comprehension required by his role in the transaction."'3'
Nonetheless, a professional advisor otherwise within the scope of the statute
may be subject to an ethically imposed duty of inquiry or due diligence
requirement and thereby be deemed to have "reason to know" of the false or
fraudulent nature of statements in an offering despite an otherwise limited
role in the offering. For example, under ABA Opinion 346, an attorney is
subject to a duty of inquiry in connection with the issuance of a tax shelter
opinion.32 A similar duty is reflected in the revised Treasury Department
original Senate version of TEFRA and was added in conference. The conference report provides:
The addition of "has reason to know" clarifies that the Secretary
may rely on objective evidence of the knowledge of a promoter
or salesperson (for example) to prove that he deliberately fur-
nished a false or fraudulent statement. For example, a salesman
would ordinarily be deemed to have knowledge of the facts
revealed in the sales material which are furnished to him by the
promoter.
1982 Conference Report, at 572, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad News at 1344.
30 The "knows or has reason to know" standard is found in the innocent spouse provisions of §
6013(e). See Code Section 6013(e) (1) (B). In that context, the courts have used as a guideline
what a reasonable person in the circumstances of the spouse could be expected to know. See
Sanders v. United States, 509 F. 2d 162, 166-67 (5th Cir. 1975); Terzian v. Commissioner, 72
T.C. 1164, 1170 (1979); Khoury, TEFRA's Compliance Provision: Impact on Tax Shelter
Investments, 7 Tax'n for Indiv. 195. at 203-04 (1983).
The Restatement of Agency characterizes the phrase "reason to know" as follows:
A person has reason to know of a fact if he has information from
which a person of ordinary intelligence, or of the superior intelli-
gence which such person may have, would infer that the fact in
question exists or that there is such a substantial chance of its
existence that, if exercising reasonable care with reference to the
matter in question, his action would be predicated upon the
assumption of its possible existence.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 9 comment a (1958).
31 1982 Conference Report, at 572, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1344.
32 See ABA Revised Opinion 346. ABA Revised Opinion 346 adopts portions of ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 335 (1974), dealing with
assumed-facts opinions in connection with the sale of unregistered securities. Opinion 335, as
quoted in Opinion 346, provides:
[T]he lawyer should, in the first instance, make inquiry of his
client as to the relevant facts and receive answers. If any of the
alleged facts, or the alleged facts taken as a whole, are incom-
plete in a material respect; or are suspect; or are inconsistent; or
either on their face or on the basis of other known facts are open
to question, the lawyer should make further inquiry...
(A]ssuming that the alleged facts are not incomplete in a material
respect, or suspect, or in any way inherently inconsistent, or on
their face or on the basis of other known facts open to question,
the lawyer may properly assume that the facts as related to him
by his client, and checked by him by reviewing such appropriate
documents as are available, are accurate.
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Circular 230 which regulates practice before the Service of both attorneys
and accountants. 33
False or fraudulent statements are essentially of two types: (1) those
regarding factual matters and (2) those regarding the law or conclusions of
law, specifically in this context the availability of various tax shelter benefits
under the internal revenue laws. The former would encompass offerings
structured around tax shelter assets that are overvalued or nonexistent. In
cases involving overvalued assets, the alternative ground under Section 6700,
that of gross valuation overstatement, may also apply. Tax shelter promotions
based on complete factual fabrications have generally been the focus of crim-
inal prosecutions. 34 Generally speaking, the nature of any action based on a
false or fraudulent statement as to factual matters will necessarily depend on
the particular facts.
Proving false or fraudulent an explanation of law proffered in connection
with a tax shelter may present the Government with substantial difficulties of
proof given the structure of most tax shelter offerings. Often, it may be diffi-
cult to demonstrate an unequivocal false or fraudulent statement under Sec-
tion 6700 since tax shelter offering materials, particularly the tax opinion
portions, are drafted with careful attention to qualifying or disclaiming the
accuracy of any statement or conclusion as to current law. On the other
hand, TEFRA's substantial understatement penalty, Code Section 6661,
complicates the ability of promoters and tax opinion authors to offer highly
qualified opinions and avoid direct conclusions as to the likelihood that tax
benefits represented will be realized. 35 Under new Section 6661, tax shelter
opinions must state that a shelter's tax benefits are "more likely than not" to
The essence of this opinion., is that, while a lawyer should
make adequate preparation including inquiry into the relevant
facts... and while he should not reasonably believe to be true,
he does not have the responsibility to "audit" the affiars of his
client or to assume, without reasonable cause, that a client's
statement on the facts cannot be relied upon.
Opinion 346 continues:
For instance, where essential underlying information, such as an
appraisal or financial projection, makes little common sense, or
where the reputation or expertise of the person who has prepared
the appraisal or projection is dubious, further inquiry clearly is
required. Indeed, failure to make further inquiry may result in a
false opinion.
33 Final Rule, Treasury Department Circular 230, 49 Fed. Reg. 6719 (Feb. 23, 1984) (31
C.F.R. pt. 10). See also, Leslie Shapiro, "Duties of Lawyer Giving Tax Shelter Opinions Clari-
fied," Legal Times, 27 (April 23, 1984.) Cf., Fass, Due Diligence under the Federal Securities
Laws for Tax Sheltered Investments, 1 Tax Shelt. Invest. L. Rep. 1 (1981).
34 See, e.g., United States v. Allen, No. 83-3445 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (sham real estate transac-
tions); United States v. Solomon, No. CR 82-496-WHO (N.D. Cal. 1983) (fraudulent patent
interests); United States v. Duffel, No. CR 81-1075-CHH (C.D. Cal. 1982) (fabricated purchases
of commercial trucks). But cf., United States v. North American Investment Group, Ltd et al,
No. 84-C-3683-H (N.D. Ill. government complaint filed April 30, 1984) (Government seeking
injunction under Code Section 7408 against defendants alleged by Government to have repres-
ented tax benefits as available to partnerships from ownership of buildings which Government
alleges were in fact never acquired by defendants on behalf of such partnerships).
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be realized for the investor to avoid the understatement penalty.36 Similar
requirements including limitations on qualified and so-called "assumed facts"
opinions are imposed by Treasure Department Circular 230 and ABA Opin-
ion 346.31
Assuming the tax opinion or other promotional material misstates the law
or erroneously applies the law to the facts, the Government must still estab-
lish that the defendant knew or had reason to know of the mistatement.38 The
ability of the Government to establish such scienter is clouded by the recent
decision in United States v Dahlstrom.3 9 In Dahlstrom, the Ninth Circuit
overturned the criminal conviction of a tax shelter promoter because the
validity for tax purposes of the offshore trust promotion at issue was held by
the Court to be unclear under the legal precedents existing at the time of
indictment. Accordingly, the Court reasoned that the Government could not
establish "willfulness" on the part of the defendant necessary to sustain the
conviction. 40 It may be similarly difficult for the government to establish that
defendants in an injunction action knew or had reason to know of the false or
fraudulent nature of a given statement of law if the shelter at issue was based
on novel and untested interpretations of the internal revenue laws.
c. Gross Valuation Overstatement
A gross valuation overstatement is basically a statement purporting to
value an asset for tax purposes at more than 200% of its correct value. 41 In
35 See Section III.A infra.
36 See Code Section 6661(b) (2) (C); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-5(d) (Mar. 15, 1983). The
failure of any offering to state that the tax benefits will be more likely than not realized based on
a thorough discussion of the relevant issues will no doubt substantially affect marketability of the
shelter. See Holden, "Treasury Wages War on Abusive Tax Shelters," Legal 7imes, Oct. 25,
1982, at 23.37 See supra, notes 32 and 33.38 See supra, notes 29 through 33 and accompanying text.
39 713 F 2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied U.S.L.W. ( ,1984).
40 The Dahlstrom court states (713 F. 2d ):
We are convinced that the legality of the tax shelter program
advocated by the appellants in this case was completely unsettled
in the indictment. "It is settled that when the law is highly debat-
able, a defendant-actually or imputedly-lacks the requisite
intent to violate it." A criminal proceeding pursuant to section
7206 "is an inappropriate vehicle for pioneering interpretations
of tax law."(citations omitted. Accord United States v. Garber, 607 F 2d 92, 100 (5th Cir. 1979). United
States Y. Critzer, 498 F. 2d. 1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1974).
41 See Code Section 6700(a) (2) (B). Code Section 6700(b) (1) provides:
(1) GROSS VALUATION OVERSTATEMENT DEFINED.-
For purposes of this section, the term "gross valuation over-
statement" means any statement as to the value of any property
or services if-
(A) the value so stated exceeds 200 percent of the amount
determined to be the correct valuation, and
(B) the value of such property or services is directly
related to the amount of any deduction or credit allowance under
chapter I to any participant.
The applicable percentage was reduced in conference from the
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contrast to "false or fraudulent" statement as a ground for liability under
Section 6700, there is no requirement of knowledge on the defendant's part
as to making or furnishing a "gross valuation overstatement. '42 Even disclaim-
er of knowledge regarding the accuracy of a valuation is insufficient to avoid
liability.43 Thus, liability would attach to an advisor otherwise subject to the
statute even if the advisor in good faith disclaims knowledge as to the accu-
racy of any valuation and complies with any ethical duty of inquiry or stand-
ard of due diligence. The standard of liability for a gross valuation overstate-
ment is therefore one of strict liability-any making or furnishing of a gross
valuation overstatement is actionable without regard to the good faith or
reasonableness of the person making or furnishing the statement.44 A profes-
sional advisor, such as tax counsel, may be deemed to have made or fur-
nished a gross valuation overstatement by merely restating the promoter's
valuation of the tax shelter asset as an assumed fact in the tax opinion.45
The primary element in establishing a gross valuation overstatement is
determining the "correct valuation" of the asset alleged to be overvalued.
Correct valuation will generally equate with an asset's fair market value.46
Fair market value is generally defined for purposes of the internal revenue
Senate's proposed 400% to the present 200%. See 1982 Conference Report, at 573, reprinted
in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1344-45. Compare Code Section 6700(b) (1) with §
6659 ("valuation overstatement" defined as a value in exces of 150% of correct value). See
Section III, infra. While "overstatement" under 6659 applies only to property, "gross valuation
overstatement" under 6700 includes both property and services. See Code Section 6700(b) (1)
(B). Deductions for services have been disallowed in tax shelter cases on the ground that the
value of the services was inflated. See Blitzer v. United States, 684 F. 2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1982);
Keller v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 7 (1982).
42 Id
43 The Senate Finance Committee Report on Tangement or any other plan or arrangements
when, in connection with such organization or sale, the person makes or furnishes ... a gross
valuation overstatement as to a matter material to the entity, plan or arrangement, whether or
not the accuracy of the statement is disclaimed
1982 Senate Report, at 267, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1015 (emphasis
added.)
44 But compare Section II.A,[6], infra (waiver of penalty).
45 Cf. supra notes 32 and 33.
46 See e.g. I.R.C. § 48(d) (proper asset valuation for purposes of investment tax credit pass-
through to lessee is asset's fair market value). See also Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F
2d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 1976) (limited partner denied deductions related to property after failing
to show that purchase price was at least approximately equal to fair market value of property);
Brannen Y. Commissioner, 722 F. 2d 695 (11 th Cir.), affd 78 T.C. 471, 494-95 (1982); Lemmen
Y. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1326, 1348 (1981) (cost basis in cattle-raising tax shelter limited to
fair market value rather than purchase price where "transaction is not conducted at arm's length
by two economically self-interested parties or where a transaction is based upon 'peculiar cir-
cumstances' which influence the purchaser to agree to a price in exces of the property's fair
market value"). See generally Avent and Grimes, Inflated Pw'chase Money Indebtedness in Real
Estate and Other Investments, J. Real Est. Tax. 99 ( ). Gans, Re-Examining the Sham
Doctrine: When Should an Overpayment be Reflected in Basis, 30 Buffalo L. Rev. 95 (1981).
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laws with reference to the willing buyer-willing seller test of valuation.47
Proving valuation in tax shelter cases typically requires competent expert test-
imony, which may be difficult to develop if the tax shelter asset is, as is often
the case, unique, obscure or otherwise difficult to value.48
Establishing gross valuation overstatement also requires that the value of
the subject property or services be "directly related to the amount of any
deduction or credit allowable under chapter 1 [of the Code] to any partici-
pant."49 While the legislative history is silent, the statute appears to require
that the asset valuation in question be shown to affect directly the amount of
tax credit or deduction allowable to the investor under the internal revenue
laws.50 Given the materiality requirement, however, the "directly related"
element may be unnecessary surplusage.
5. Contesting the Penalty
Code Section 6703 sets forth the procedure for contesting any penalty
imposed under Section 6700.51 The penalty may be contested only in federal
district court; neither the Tax Court nor the Claims Court his jurisdiction.52
However, unlike a typical refund suit, the penalty may be contested upon the
payment of only 15 percent of the penalty amount.53
47 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-l(c) (2), 20.2031-1(b), 25.2512-1 (fair market value is
price at which property could change hands between a willing buyer and willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant
facts). Accord 1982 Senate Report, at 267, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
1015. See generally Rev. Proc. 66-49, 1966-2 C.B. 1257 (IRS guidelines for valuation appraisals
of contributed property).
48 See, e.g., Anselmo v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 872 (1983) (proper valuation of gemstones for
purposes of charitable deduction); Siegel v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 659 (1982) (valuation of
motion picture). The task of proving overvaluation under § 6700 is further complicated by the
fact that, unlike proceedings in the Tax Court or actions for refund, the government under §
6700 bears the burden of proof. See infra Section II.A.[5].
Recognizing the burden of proving overvaluation by experts on a case-by-case basis, the Ser-
vice and Treasury Department applying in limited instances an approach to valuation based on
the time value of money. Expressed in the simplest terms, the time value of money is the differ-
ence between the value of immediately available funds and the right to receive funds at some
time in the future. M. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation 5 (3d ed. 1982). Under a time value
of money approach to valuation, the Service compares the represented valuation of an asset for
tax purposes (e.g., cost basis) with the present value of the consideration paid for the asset. See
Rev. Rul. 82-224, 1982-2 C.B. 5. In Revenue ruling 82-224, a tax shelter investor was held
subject to a § 6659 penalty for underpayment of tax attributable to valuation overstatement. The
cost basis of the tax shelter asset, as stated in the shelter's promotional literature, was found by
the Ruling to exceed 250% of the amount determined to be the asset's correct value, which the
ruling arrived at by discounting to present value the principal-only recourse indebtedness financ-
ing the asset. Cf., Caruth v. United States, 566 F. 2d 901 (5th Cir. 1978).
49Code Section 6700(b) (1) (B).
10 See id.
5' Section 6703 also applies to penalties assessed under Code Section 6701 (knowingly aiding
and abetting in the understatement of another's tax), see, Section III. B., infra, and Code Section
6702 ($500 penalty for filing of a frivilous return).
2 See Code Section 6703(b).
5 Section 6703(c). See generally, Michael I. Saltzman, IRS Practice and Procedure (Warren
Gorham & Lamant 1981) at S 7.09F (Vol. 2, 1983 Supp.). The procedural provisions of
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In an action under Section 6703, the burden of proof is on the Govern-
ment to prove liability for the Section 6700 penalty. While the specific stand-
ard of proof is not specified, the appropriate standard would appear to be
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.M
In contesting the penalty in district court under Section 7603, the party
contesting the penalty has the right to trial by jury.55 Note, however, that the
right to jury trial on the penalty would not be available if an earlier injunc-
tion proceeding under Code Section 7408 has already found the conduct at
issue to be subject to the penalty.56 In that circumstance, collateral estoppel
would appear to bar relitigating the issue of liability for the penalty altogether
even though the bar denies the plaintiff his otherwise available right to a jury
trial.5 7
As a practical matter, liability for and amount of any Section 6700 penalty
might be better determined as part of a settlement of an injunction action
instituted under Section 7408 with the penalized party generally waived the
right to contest any penalty agreed to.58 Even when a penalized party insti-
tutes an action under Section 6703 contesting the penalty under Section 6700
one should carefully consider whether a jury trial is strategically appropriate.
Juries are notoriously pro-Government in tax shelter cases.5 9 A jury trial,
absent particular circumstances (e.g., governmental misconduct) is seldom a
positive strategy in tax shelter compliance litigation.
Section 6703 are almost identical to Section 6694 which provides for the contesting of tax return
preparer penalties upon the payment of 15 percent of the assessed penalty. Code Sections
6694(c) (1) and (2), 6695; Treas. Reg. § 1.6696-1. The procedural requirements provided for in
Section 6694 have been held to be jurisdictional and the failure to meet the specified
requirements.-e.g., filing of an action in district court within 30 days of denial of claim for
refund-bars further contest of the penalties. See, e.g., Mayo v. United States, 82-2 U.S.T.C.
para. 9488 (W.D. La. 1982); Powell v. Kopman, 81-1 U.S.T.C. para. 9383 (S.D. N.Y. 1981).
See generally, Saltzman, 4.05[3].
54 See Section II.B.[5], infra. Cf., Code Section 7427 (burden of proof on Government to
prove tax preparer willful understatement of tax).
5 28 U.S.C. Section 2402; 28 U.S.C. Section 1346(a) (1).
56 Establishing conduct subject to penalty under Section 6700 is an element in obtaining an
injunction under Code Section 7408. See Section II.B., infra.
57 See United States v. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). See Section II.B.[6], infra.
58 Indeed, the IRS has generally sought 6700 penalties to date only in conjunction with suits
for injunction under Section 7408 and not as separate assessments. See United States P. Krupp, et
al, No. 84-1327 RMT(GX) (C.D. Calif. May 24, 1984) (leasing of master recordings) (promo-
ter consent to § 7408 injunction) (undisclosed amount of § 6700 penalties settled by sepatate
closing agreement); United States v. Day, et al., No. C-84-563A (N.D. Ga. Mar. 20, 1984)
(computer leasing shelter) (promoter consent to § 7408 injunction) (includes $36,000 in total §
6700 penalties imposed as to two defendants, penalty waived as to third defendant); United
States v. Computer Alternatives, et aL, No. C-84-1032 (N.D. Calif. Mar. 6, 1984) (computer
leasing shelter)(consent of promoters and salesman to § 7408 injunction) (includes payment of
$50,000 in § 6700 penalties); United States v. Mid-American Consultants, Inc., et aL, No. 83-
2662 C(3) (E.D. Mo. Nov. 23, 1983) (interest accrual real estate time-sharing shelter) (promoter
consent to § 7408 injunction) (includes payment of $38,000 in § 6700 penalty); United States v.
Packaging Industries Group, Inc., et aL, No. 83-2307-N (D. Mass. Aug. 8, 1983) (equipment
leasing shelter) (promoter and attorney consent to § 7408 injunction) (includes payment of
$451,000 in § 6700 penalty by promoter).
59 See, e.g., Wehrly v. United States, No. 83-1188 (D. Ore. April 20, 1984) (tax benefits of
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No statute of limitations is specified for any penalty imposed under Section
6700.60 Code Section 6501 specifies the statute of limitations generally appli-
cable in tax cases by reference to the filing of a return.61 However, since
Section 6700 may be imposed without regard to the filing of any return the
period of limitations under Section 6501 would appear inapposite.62 Com-
pare the statute of limitations applicable to criminal conspiracy to evade
taxes,6s which is six years64 and begins to run from the date of the last overt
act committed in furtherance of the conspiracy 6 even though the overt act
may not itself violate any law.66
6. Waiver
Section 6700(b) (2) provides that the penalty may be waived on a showing
of reasonable basis and good faith, but this waiver authority applies only to
penalties imposed for gross valuation overstatements. 67 No waiver authority
applies to penalty based on false or fraudulent statement.68 The waiver
authority sets forth both objective ("reasonable basis") and subjective ("good
faith") standards, the same standards applicable for waiver of the substantial
understatement penalty.69
The waiver authority gives the Service discretion in asserting the penalty.
For example, the waiver provision might be applied when the person other-
wise subject to penalty, acting in good faith, had no knowledge or reason to
know of the overvaluation at issue.70 The waiver provisions mitigate some-
what the otherwise harsh result dictated by defining gross valuation over-
statement in Section 6700 without reference to any scienter on the person
commodities shelter scheme disallowed by jury verdict); Knox Y. United States, No. 83-2463
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 1984) (jury found tax benefits from master recording shelter to be improper
for lack of profit motive); Corrao v. United States, No. 80-86-HEC (D. Nev. 1982) (jury held
losses from commodity tax shelter not allowable).
60 Cf., Code Sections 6700 and 6703.
61 Code Section 6501.
62 Cf., Code Section 6700.
63 Code Section 6531(8).
" See United States v. Klein, 247 F. 2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 924 (1958).65 Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-397 (1957); Fiswick v. United States, 329
U.S. 211, 216 (1946).
" United States v. Rabinowich, 237 U.S. 76, 86 (1915).67 Code Section 6700(b) (2).
68 Id
69 Code Section 6661(c). See Section IV.A, infra. Cf., Saltzman, 7.09A, S7-25, n. 3 (Vol. 2,
1983 Supp.); Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(a) (4). See also Code Section 6659(e) (waiver of the
valuation overstatement penalty).
70 However, the legislative history construes the appropriate circumstances for waiver nar-
rowly in cases of reliance on appraisals of valuation:
The Secretary is given authority to waive all or part of any
penalty resulting from a gross valuation overstatement, upon a
showing that there was a reasonable basis for the valuation and
the valuation was made in good faith. The mere existence of an
appraisal is not sufficient, by itself, to show either reasonable
basis or good faith. Rather, the Secretary may, for example,
examine the basis for the appraisal, the manner in which it was
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subject to the penalty.71 On the other hand, there is no provision in the
statute for review if the Service refuses to waive all or part of the penalty.
B. Injunction of Abusive Tax Shelters
1. Generally
Code Section 7408,72 as enacted by TEFRA, provided that a district court
obtained, and the appraiser's relationship to the investment or
promoter.
Joint Comm. Explanation, at 212.
71 See Section II.A. [4] [c], supra. In United States Y. Day et aL, No. C-84-563A (N.D. Ga.
Mar. 20, 1984), two individuals and one corporate defendant, without admitting or denying
liability, entered into consent judgements of injunction under Section 7408. The United States
waived the 6700 penalty as to one defendant whom it asserted in its Complaint had made or
furnished gross valuation overstatements by virtue of his role in tax shelter promotions at issue.
Though the waiver was actually covered by a separate and undisclosed closing agreement, the
court order of judgement provides:
5. It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that, as provided by a separte agreement among [the defendant]
and the Internal Revenue Service dated March 20, 1984, the
United States of America waives the penalty provided in Section
6700 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended (26
U.S.C.) relating to the organization and sale of interests in Omni
Energy Management I and I, Poultry Energy Management I and
Fast Food Energy Management (the "tax shelters"). As further
provided in said agreement, the United States makes this waiver
in complete satisfaction of the amount of any penalty which may
be imposed upon [the defendant], pursuant to Sections 6700 and
6701 of the Internal Revenue Code relating to the organization
and sale of interests in the above-named tax shelters.
Final Judgement of Permanent Injunction As To Robert E. Moynihan (entered March 20,
1984), Day, No. C-84-563A (N.D. Ga. 1984).
7 Code Section 7408 provides:
SEC. 7408. ACTION TO ENJOIN PROMOTERS OF ABU-
SIVE TAX SHELTERS, ETC.
(a) Authority to Seek Injunction.-A civil action in the name
of the United States to enjoin any person from further engaging
in conduct subject to penalty under section 6700 (relating to
penalty for promoting abusive tax shelters, etc.) or section 6701
(relating to penalties for aiding and abetting understatement of
tax liability) may be commenced at the request of the Secretary.
Any action under this section shall be brought in the district
court of the United States for the district in which such person
resides, has his principle place of business, or has engaged in
conduct subject to penalty under section 6700 or section 6701.
The court may exercise its jurisdiction over such action (as pro-
vided in section 7402(a)) separate and apart from any other
action brought by the United States against such person.
(b) Adjudication and Decree.-In any action under subsection
(a), if the court finds-
(1) that the person has engaged in any conduct subject to
penalty under section 6700 (relating to penalty for promoting
abusive tax shelters, etc.) or section 6701 (relating to penalties
for aiding and abetting understatement of tax liability, and
(2) that injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent recur-
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may enjoin a defendant if it finds that the defendant has engaged in conduct
subject to penalty under either Code Section 6700 and that an injunction is
"appropriate to prevent recurrence of such conduct. 73 Section 7408 was
amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1984 to include conduct subject to
penalty under 6701 as additional grounds for seeking injunction. While the
discussion here will focus primarily on interaction between Section 7408 and
Section 6700, the principles are generally applicable and Section 6701 as
well. Note, however, that the penalty under Section 6701 is fairly limited
because of strict scienter requirement. See Section III, B., infra.
2. Actionable Conduct
Obtaining injunctive relief is predicated on establishing that the defendant's
conduct is actionable under Section 6700 or Section 6701.74 However, while
the statute requires that the defendant be found to have engaged in conduct
subject to either of the penalties, the penalties need not have been imposed
prior to seeking injunctive relief. Congress intended that the new injunctive
remedy be available without regard to any other power or authority of the
Service, including the assessment of penalties.75 Further, section 7408 injunc-
tive relief may be granted regardless of whether returns have been filed or
audited.7 6
3. Appropriateness of Injunctive Relief
If the court concludes that the defendant has engaged in conduct actiona-
rence of such conduct or in any other activity subject to penalty
under section 6700 or section 6701.
73 Id. Code Section 7408(b). The Tax Reform Act of 1984 added conduct subject to penalty
under Code Section 6701 to conduct subject to penalty under Code Section 6700 as a proper
ground for injunction under Section 7408. Act Section 143. See 1984 Conf. Rep. at 227.
74 Id. Code Section 7408(b) (1)
75 Code Section 7408(a) provides in relevant part: "[T]he court may exercise its jurisdiction
over such action (as provided in section 7402(a)) separate and apart from any other action
brought by the United States against such person." § 7408(a). See also 1982 Senate Report, at
268-69, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1016-17; 1982 Joint Comm. Expla-
nation, at 213. Cf., United States v. White, 84-1 U.S.T.C. para. 9441 (Minn. May 1, 1984);
United States v. Jones, 83-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9741 (N.D. Tex. 1983); United States v. Buttorff, 553
F. Supp. 450 (N.D. Tex. 1983); United States Y. Hutchinson, 51 A.F.T.R. 2d 1141 (S.D. Calif.
1983).
A similar rule prevails under § 7407, where an injunction may be sought to restrain a tax
return preparer from abusive activities "without regard to whether or not penalties have been or
may be assessed." SD. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 359, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 3439, 3788 [hereinafter cited as 1976 Senate Report]. See also H. R. Rep.
No. 658, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 281, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2897,
3176-77 [hereinafter cited as 1976 House Report]; 1976 Joint Comm. Explanation, supra note
19, at 355, reprinted in 1976-3 (Vol. 2) C.B. at 367.
76 See 1982 Senate Report, at 268, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1016.
"The ability to seek injunction relief will insure that the Internal Revenue Service can attack tax
shelter schemes years before such challenges would prove possible if the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice were required to await the filing and examination of tax returns by investors." Id. See also
id. at 267, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1015.
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ble under Code Section 6700 or Code Section 6701, to grant injunctive relief
the court must also determine "that injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent
recurrence of such conduct. ' 77 The identical language is employed under
Code Section 7407 which authorizes injunctive actions against return prepar-
ers who engage in specific types of improper conduct.7 Decisions entering or
denying injunctions under Section 7407 to date have not addressed the evi-
dentiary foundation necessary to support a finding that injunctive relief is
"appropriate to prevent recurrence" 79 and the legislative history is similarly
unrevealing."80
In the first opinion issued under Code Section 7408, United States v. But-
torff,8' the district court found injunctive relief appropriate to prevent recur-
rence of the defendant's conduct.82 The defendant had previously been con-
victed of crimes involving illegal tax protestor activities similar to those at
issue in the injunction action.83 The court first found that the defendant knew
or had reason to know that his assertions as to the availability of tax benefits
7 Code Section 7408(b) (2).
78 See id. Code Section 7407(b). Code Section 7407(b) provides in relevant part:
(b) Adjudication and Decrees.-In any action under subsection
(a), if the court finds-
(1) that an income tax return preparer has
(A) engaged in any conduct subject to penalty under
section 6694 or 6695, or subject to any criminal penalty pro-
vided by this title,
(B) misrepresented his eligibility to practice before
the Internal Revenue Service, or otherwise misrepresented his
experience or education as an income tax return preparer,
(C) guaranteed the payment of any tax refund or the
allowance of any tax credit, or
(D) engaged in any other fraudulent or deceptive
conduct which substantially interferes with the proper adminis-
tration of the Internal Revenue laws, and
(2) that injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent the rec-
urrence of such conduct, the court may enjoin such person from
further engaging in such conduct.
Id. Code Section 7407 was enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 along with several
other provisions and amendments directed at controlling abuses by tax return preparers. See
supra note 75.
7 See generally United States v. May, 555 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Mich. 1983); United States v.
Ernst & Whinney, 549 F. Supp. 1303 (N.D. Ga. 1982), rev'd F.2d (11th Cir. ,
1984); United States . Landsberger, 534 F. Supp. 142 (D. Minn.), afl'd in part, vacated and
remanded n part, 692 F. 2d 501 (8th Cir. 1982).
s0 See generally 1976 Senate Report, at 349-59, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 3778-89; 1976 House Report, at 273-82, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 3168-78; 1976 Joint Comm. Explanation, at 345-56, reprinted in 1976-3 (Vol. 2) C.B.
at 357-68.
81 563 F. Supp. 450 (N.D. Tex. 1983) defendant appeal docketed, No. 83-1368 (5th Cir.).
Buttorff was the first case filed by the government under § 7408 and the only case to date in
which an opinion has been issued. Buttorff is also indicative of the scope of Sections 6700 and
7408 in reaching beyond typical "tax shelter" investments to include such tax avoidance schemes
as mail order ministries and family trust arrangements. See 1982 Joint Comm. Explanation, at
211.
82 Id. at 455.
83 Id. Buttoroff had been convicted of aiding and abetting taxpayers in filing false withholding
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were false or fraudulent in violation of section 6700(a) (2) (A). 84 Based on
the defendant's prior conviction and continued activities that were the subject
of the injunction suit, the court then found it likely that he would continue
the abusive activities at issue unless enjoined.85 Accordingly, the court
enjoined the defendant from engaging in further promotion and sale of the
"Constitutional Pure Equity Trust," a family trust arrangement which had no
validity for federal income tax purposes.86
Case law in the area of securities regulation provides additional reference
for construing the appropriateness of injunctive relief standard under Code
Section 7408.87 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 88 acting
under its own civil injunction statutes, is entitled to injunctive relief upon a
"proper showing" that any person "is engaged or is about to engage" in
violations of the securities laws.89 The courts have construed a "proper show-
ing" as requiring the SEC to establish (1) that a statutory violationof the
securities laws has occurred and (2) that defendant's illegal conduct is rea-
sonably likely to recur.90 In determining the likelihood of recurrence where
the violation conduct has ceased, courts in the securities context have tradi-
tionally relied upon a defendant's past conduct, including the conduct precipi-
forms based on his claims that the federal income tax was unconstitutional. See United States v.
Buttoroff, 572 F. 2d. 619 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 437 U.S. 906 (1978)
84 563 F. Supp. at 454.
85 563 F. Supp. at 455.
86 Id.
87 The legislative history of Code Section 6700 and 7408 notes the parallels between those
statutes and the securities laws. The Senate Finance Committees stated: "The Committee recog-
nizes that the Securities and Eschange Commission has power that may be directed toward some
tax shelter promoters but believes Internal Revenue Service enforcement in this area will mate-
rially contribute to a solution of this problem in a number of ways." 1982 Senate Report, supra
note 14, at 266, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1014.
81 The SEC consists of five commissioners and support staff. The SEC has enforcement juris-
diction over tax shelter offerings to the estent such offerings constitute "securities." See, e.g. SEC
v. Aqua-Sonics Prod Corp., 687 G. 2d 577, 582-83 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 568
(1983); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F. 2d 633, 641 (9th Cir. 1980). See generally, Lynch and Murphy,
"The SEC's Enforcement Efforts Against Tax Shelters", Tax Shelter Controversies, 136-199
(Law and Business, Inc. 1983); Gourevitch, The Role of the SEC in Tax Matters, 33 Inst. on
Fed. Tax'n 1317 (1975). Abusive tax shelter offerings often attempt to circumvent SEC or state
securities enforcement actions by claiming that the interests offered do not constitute "securities."
See 15 Sec. Reg. & L. Reg. (BNA), No. 5, at 283 (1983) (Wisconsin Securities Commissioner
to consider further whether a postage stamp leasing arrangement involved the sale of securities
where "formalities" of arrangement indicated that leases were not securities, but "practicalities"
indicated otherwise). Cf. SEC v. Aqua-Sonics Prod Corp., 687 F. 2d 577 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 568 (1983).
89 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976). The comparable
sections of the other securities laws that the SEC is charged with enforcing include: Securities
Act of 1933, § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 321(a), 15
U.S.C. § 77uuu(a) (1976) (incorporating by reference § 20 of the Securities Act of 1933); Public
Utility Act of 1935, § 18(0, 15 U.S.C. § 79r(f) (1976); Investment Company Act of 1940, §
42(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(e) (1976); Investment Advisors Act of 1940, § 209(e), 15 U.S.C. §
80b-9(e) (1976).
90 See, e.g., SEC Y. Monarch Fund, 608 F. 2d 938 (2d Cir. 1979) (test is whether defendant's
past conduct indicates a reasonable likelihood of future violations; SEC v. American Realty
Trust, 586 F. 2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978) (injunction granted upon showing that material statements
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tating the injunctive action.91 Other factors relevant in determining whether a
"proper showing" has been made include character or past violations, effec-
tiveness of discontinuance, bona fide expression of intent to comply, number
and duration of past wrongs, time elapsed since the last violation, opportunity
to commit further illegal acts, novelty of the violation, harmful impact of
injunction on defendant, and willfulness or bad faith in the defendant's con-
duct.92 The courts have recently emphasized these factors in SEC injunction
actions and have correspondingly de-emphasized shomewhat the role of past
violations in finding a reasonable likelihood of continued violations. 93 For
example, in SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,94 the Second Circuit stated that
"there is no per se rule requiring the issuance of an injunction upon the
showing of a past violation." and that the Commission must prove "some-
thing more than the mere possibility" that violations will be repeated.95
Under Section 7408, the government must prove that injunctive relief is
"appropriate" to prevent recurrence of section 6700 conduct, 96 which is
and omissions in proxy statement and prospectus resulted from negligence); SEC v. North Am.
Research and Dev. Corp., 424 F. 2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970) (case remanded to determine the likeli-
hood of defendants' engaging in proscribed conduct in the future); SEC v. Paro, 468 F. Supp.
635 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (to obtain injunction, SEC must demonstrate probable success on the
merits and a likelihood of continuing violations).
9' See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F. 2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972)
(expectations of future ciolations reasonable where defendants did not attempt to cease unlawful
activity until SEC investigations began); SEC v. Culpeper, 270 F. 2d. 241, 250 (2d. Cir. 1959)
(in assessing the need for injunctive relief, courts should consider the public interest involved as
well as the character of defendants' past behavior); SEC v. Globus Int'l, Ltd, 320 F. Supp. 158,
160 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (illegal past conduct implies that defendant is reasonably likely to violate
statute in the future). Cf. SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc. 515 F. 2d. 801, 808-09 (2d. Cir.
1975) (issuing an injunction automatically upon showing of illegal activity not justified absent a
finding of a reasonable likelihood the wrong will be repeated); SEC v. Cal-Am. Corp., 445 F.
Supp. 1329, 1336 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (current misfeasance one of the best indications of the
likelihood of future violations).
92 See, e.g., SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp. 546 F. 2d. 1044, 1048 (2d. Cir. 1976) (court
may consider the likelihood of future violations, the degree of scienter involved, the sincerity of
defendant's assurances against future violations, the nature of the infractions, and defendant's
recognition of his wrongdoing), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); SEC V. Management Dynam-
ics, Inc. 515 F. 2d. 801, 807-09 (2d. Cir. 1975) (whether defendant is likely to repeat wrongful
acts depends on the totality of facts and circumstances); SEC v. Paro, 468 F. Supp. 635
(N.D.N.Y. 1979) (in addition to establishing past violations, the SEC should be ready to present
proof concerning the degree of intent involved, the degree and frequency of the violations,
whether the defendant continues to maintain that his past conduct was blameless, the sincerity of
defendant's assurances against future violations, and whether future violations can be reasonably
expected given defendant's professional standing).
93 See, e.g., SEC v. Mize, 615 F. 2d. 1046 (5th Cir.) (case remanded for determination of
likelihood of future violations considering all the facts and circumstances involved), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 901 (1980); SEC v. Caterinicchia, 613 F. 2d. 109 (5th Cir. 1980) (denial of injunction
affirmed even though defendants had previously violated the securities laws); SEC v. Arthur
Young, 590 F. 2d. 785 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that auditors would not violate securities laws in
the future not clearly erroneous); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem Sec., 574 F. 2d. 90, 99-100 (2d.
Cir. 1978) (SEC needs to prove more than past violations). See Eisenberg, SEC Injunctions-
Standards for Imposition, Modification and Dissolution, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 27, 32-41 (1980).
94 565 F. 2d. 8 (2d. Cir. 1977).
95 Id. at 18. Cf., Aaron v. SEC. 446 U.S. 680, 700-02 (1980).
96 See Code Section 7408(b) (2).
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arguably a less restrictive standard from the government's standpoint than the
"is engaged or about to engage [in a violation]" standard applicable under the
securities laws. 97 A court could conceivably find injunctive relief "appro-
priate" under Section 7408 when recurrence is merely a possibility, even a
remote one. On the other hand, as a practical matter, a court acting in its
discretion to determine whether an injunction is "appropriate to prevent rec-
urrance" is unlikely in a contested action to enter an injunction for the
government if the likelihood of recurrence is remote. Indeed, for the govern-
ment to urge the entry of an injunction under Section 7408 where the likeli-
hood of recurrence is remote would be subject to challenge and criticism as
abuse of its authority. In the parallel context the SEC has been criticized by
commentators for overusing its injunctive authority, its most frequently util-
ized enforcement weapon. 98 Commentators have contended that the Commis-
sion sometimes pursues stale cases where there is no equity for an injunction
and where the effect of the lawsuit is a public "branding" rather than a fair
attempt to enjoin reasonably anticipated future statutory violations. 99
The government need not establish or plead irreparable injury or the
97 See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text. Judge Friendly, in SEC Y. Commonwealth
Chet. Sec., 574 F. 2d. 90 (2d. Cir. 1978) noted:
The Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act speak, after
all, of enjoining "any person (who) is engaged or about to
engage in any act of practices" which constitute or will constitute
a violation ... Our recent decisions have emphasized, perhaps
more than older ones, the need for the SEC to go beyond the
mere facts of past violations and demonstrate a realistic likeli-
hood of recurrence.
Id. at 99-100. Cf., SEC v. Dimensional Entertainment Corp. 493 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). In Dimensional Entertainment, the court refused to grant the SEC's request of injunction
premised on past violations that had led to an eight-year prison sentence. See id. at 1278-79. The
court stated:
[Tlhe more "circumspect" approach toward issuing injunctions
should consider both the likelihood of recurring violations and
the relative imminence of this threat. While the SEC need not
show that a defendant is likely to break the law next month, or
even next year, the risk posed by a potential violator with an
unexpired prison term exceeding six years is not sufficient to
warrant injunctive relief. [The Commission must establish] that
the likelihood of further violations is a real probability and not a
distant prophecy.
Id. Only when the SEC introduced evidence that the defendant would probably be paroled in a
year, had continued to insist that his conduct was lawful, and was likely to be employed in the
securities field did the court reconsider its decision and grant the injunction. See SEC v. Dimen-
sional Entertainment Corp., 518 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
98 See Mathews, Litigation and Settlement of SEC Administrative Enforcement Proceedings,
29 Cath. U.L. Rev. 215, 293 (1980).
" See id. at 288. Commentators also contend that the SEC names too many defendants in
cases where it may have strong proof against central defendants but tenuous proof against others
more peripheral to the violative acts. See also R. Karmel, Regulation by Prosecution: The Securi-
ties Exchange Commission v. Corporate America (1982); Mathews, The SEC and Civil Injunc-
tions: It's Time to Give the Commission an Administrative Cease and Desist Remedy, 6 Sec. Reg.
L.J. 345 (1979).
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absence of an adequate remedy at law to obtain an injunction."00 A showing
of immediate and irreparable harm would, however, be necessary if injunc-
tive relief were sought ex parte by temporary restraining order.101 The public
interest, rather than the interest of the private litigant, is paramount in deter-
mining the propriety of and need for relief in injunction actions authorized by
statute. 02 By enacting Section 7408, Congress has determined that the pros-
cribed conduct is inimical to the public interest. 10 3 Thus, to be entitled to
injunctive relief, the Government need only show that the statutory condi-
tions have been met.104
4. Jurisdiction and Venue
Code Section 7408(a) sets forth the proper jurisdiction and venue for an
action instituted under Section 7408.105 Allowing as proper venue any district
where a defendant "has engaged in conduct subject to penalty under section
6700 or section 6701" gives the government flexibility regarding where to file
an action for injunction under section 7408. By analogy to securities regula-
tion, venue could conceivably be laid in a district in which only a single
investor resides, far removed from the promoter's residence or principal place
10 See Code Section 7408. Cf. Aaron Y. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 700-01 (1980); FTC Y. Rhodes
Pharmacal Co., 191 F. 2d. 744, 747 (7th Cir. 1951) (preliminary injunction authorized by
statute as involving the public interest should be granted if statutory conditions are satisfied);
Bowles v. Huff, 146 F. 2d. 428 (9th Cir. 1944) (allegations and proof of absence of an adequate
remedy at law and of presence of irreparable damage not required where injunctive relief autho-
rized by statute); Henderson Y. Burd, 133 F 2d. 515, 517 (2d. Cir. 1943).
101 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b) Accord 1976 Senate Report, supra note 90, at 359, reprinted in
1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3788-89; 1976 House Report, supra note 90, at 282,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3178; 1976 Joint Comm. Explanation, supra
note 19, at 355. Cf., U. S. v. Joiner, et aL, No. c 83-2780A (N.D. Ga. Government complaint
filed Dec. 19, 1983) (Government's contested motion for temporary restraining order denied
after hearing).
102 See SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, 458 F. 2d. 1082, 1102, (2d. Cir. 1971); SEC v.
Culpeper, 270 F. 2d. 241, 250 (2d. Cir. 1959) (when public interest conflicts with private
interest in injunction cases, public interest is paramount). Accord Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S.
321, 330-31 (1944) (where injunctions authorized by statute, words of the statute should be
construed to protect the public interest); Marshall v. Lane Processing, Inc., 606 F. 2d. 518,
519-20 (8th Cir. 1979) (defendant's public image and increased difficulty in obtaining loans
were private interest and factors not to be weighed in considering whether an injunction should
issue), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922 (1980).
103 Cf., SEC Y. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F. 2d. 40, 53 (7th Cir. 1972) (public
interest enunciated in the legislation is the criterion for the proper exercise of the trial court's
equity powers); Lenroot v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 146 F. 2d. 325, 327 (8th Cir. 1945) (public
interest regarding child labor is a matter for Congress whose determination is binding on the
courts).
104 See, e.g., Donovan v. Brown Serv. Tools, Inc., 666 F. 2d. 148, 157 (5th Cir. 1982); Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm. v. Hunt, 591 F. 2d. 1211, 1220 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 921 (1979) FTC c. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 191 F. 2d. 744, 747-48 (7th Cir. 1951).
105 Code Section 7408(a) provides:
(a) AUTHORITY TO SEEK INJUNCTION.-A civil action
in the name of the United States to enjoin any person from
further engaging in conduct subject to penalty under section
6700 (relating to penalty for promoting abusive tax shelters, etc.)
may be commenced at the request of the Secretary. Any action
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or business. 106 However, in contrast to the securities laws, an injunction
action under section 7408 does not have the benefit of nationwide personal
jurisdiction and service of process.107 Personal jurisdiction and service of pro-
cess in a Section 7408 action are controlled by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 which
establishes personal jurisdiction by reference to the state "long-arm" statute in
the state where the federal district court is located. 10 8
5. Burden of Proof
Neither the burden nor the standard of proof applicable to an action under
Section 7408 is specified by the statute or its legislative history. For actions
contesting penalties imposed under Section 6700 or Section 6701, the statute
under this section shall be brought in the district court of the
United States for the district in which such person resides, has his
principal place of business, or has engaged in conduct subject to
penalty under section 6700. The court may exercise its jurisdic-
tion over such action (as provided in section 7402(a)) separate
and apart from any other action brought by the United States
against such person.
Section 7402(a) provides:
(a) TO ISSUE ORDERS, PROCESSES, AND JUDGE-
MENTS.-The district court of the United States at the instances
of the United States shall have such jurisdiction to make and
issue in civil actions, writs and orders of injunction, and of ne
exeat republica, orders appointing receivers, and such other
orders and processes, and to render such judgements and decrees
as may be necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the
internal revenue laws. The remedies hereby provided are in addi-
tion to and not exclusive of any and all other remedies of the
United States in such courts or otherwise to enforce such laws.
Interestingly, the government often alleges 7402(a) as a basis for jurisdiction of the district courts
to enter an injunction separate and apart from the jurisdiction expressly granted the Courts under
Section 7408. See U S. va. Your Heritage Protection Ass'n. et aL, No. 84-0643-R (N.D. Calif.,
April 17, 1984). Accord Hart Y. U.S., 701 F. 2d. 749 (8th Cir. 1983); Ekblad Y. US., F.
2d. (7th Cir. , 1984). But cf., U. S. Y. Ernst & Whinney, 549 F. Supp. 1303 (N.D.
Ga. 1982), government appeal docketed No. 83-8009 (11th Cir. Dec. 29, 1982) (court held
Section 7402 is not a basis for jurisdiction independent of Code Section 7407 authorizing entry
of an injunction against return preparers engaging in abusive activities).
106 See, e.g., Stern Y. Gobeloff, 332 F. Supp. 909 (D. Md. 1971) (sustaining venue in Mary-
land where plaintiffs accepted New York defendant's telephone offers to sell securities and oth-
erwise transacted with defendant through the mails). See also Hooper v. Mountain States Sec.
Corp., 282 F. 2d. 195 (5th Cir. 1960) (under Securities Exchange Act, use of mails or other
interstate facilities within forum district constituting an important step in the consummation of a
deceitful scheme involving the sale of stock is sufficient to give federal court jurisdiction), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Zorn v. Anderson, 263 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (under
Securities Act, venue is proper on basis of misleading prospectus and stock certificate received
within the district). But cf., 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) (transfer of venue for the convenience of
parties and witnesses allowed in the interests of justice). 107 Cf. Mariash Y. Morrill, 496 F. 2d.
1138 (2d. Cir. 1974) (nationwide service of process upheld under the Securities Exchange Act);
International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F. 2d. 1334, 1350 (2d. Cr.) (nationwide jurisdiction
over dominant shareholder and corporation), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974).
I08 See 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1112 (1969). See also
Martin v. Steubner, 485 F. Supp. 88, 90 (S.D. Ohio 1979), aff'd, 652 F. 2d. (6th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 1148 (1982).
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places the burden of proof on the government, 109 but fails to define the appli-
cable standard of proof.110 The standard of proof in SEC injunctioi actions,
where the SEC bears the burden of proof, is proof by a preponderance of the
evidence."' Given that Code Section 7408 and SEC civil injunction actions
serve similar remedial purposes,"12 the burden of proof on the government by
a preponderance of the evidence appears appropriate for civil injunction
actions under Section 7408." 3
6. Collateral Estoppel
a. As Bar to Subsequent Action Contesting Any Related
Penalty Determination
Because an injunction under Section 7408 is based on a finding that a
defendant has engaged in conduct subject to penalty under section 6700 or
section 6701, problems of collateral estoppel arise for any prospective
defendant." 4 A finding of penalty conduct in an action for injunction under
Section 7408 may collaterally estop the defendant from relitigating the find-
ing in a subsequent action to contest the penalty, or vice versa if the penalty
action preceded the injunction action." 5 For this reason, a defendant explor-
ing settlement of the injunction actionby consent, should consider also nego-
tiating any penalty liability at the same time in order to avoid subsequent
imposition of the penalty based on any findings, admissions or information
obtained in the course of the injunction action," 6 and care should be taken
109 See Code Section 6703(a), See Section II.A. [5]. supra.
110 Id. It has been suggested that government enforcement actions against tax shelters would be
greatly enhanced if the taxpayer rather than the government bore the burden of proof. See
Testimony of former Chief Judge Theodore Tannenwald, United States Tax Court, before the
Senate Finance Subcommittee on Oversight of the Internal Revenue Service (June 24, 1983).
1 See Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 690 (1983); Steadman v. SEC, 450
U.S. 91, 97-104, reh'g denied, 451 U.S. 933 (1981); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.
S. 344, 355 (1943).
112 See supra note 87.
113 But cf., Miller v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 915 (1969) (50% civil fraud penalty sustained
upon showing of clear and convincing evidence of actual and intentional tax evasion); Pigman v.
Commissioner, 31 T.C. 356 (1958); Rickard Y. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 316 (1929) (clear and
convincing standard of proof required under to 50% civil fraud penalty), acq. IX-I C.B. 46
(1930); Tax Ct. R. 142(b). See generally M. Saltzman, supra. IRS Practice and Procedure, para.
7.08 (1981).
114 Under res judicata, a final judgement on the merits bar further claims by the parties or
those in privity with them on the same cause of action. Collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of
issues common to different causes of action. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153
(1979); Parklane Hosiery Co. Y. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5 (1979). The Restatement of
Judgments speaks of resjudicata as "claim preclusion" and of collateral estoppel as "issue prec-
lusion." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982).
Is Cf., United States v. Abatti, 463 F. Supp. 596 (S.D. Cal. 1978) (government estopped from
raising in a criminal action issues decided for the taxpayer in a civil action). Under § 6703,
imposition of the Section 6700 penalty may be contested in federal district court upon payment
of 15% of the amount of such penalty. Code Section 6703(c). See Section II.A. [5], supra.
116 Cf., United States v. Gibralter Properties, Inc., No. 3-83-641 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (promoters
of condominium time sharing tax shelter consented to entry of § 7408 injunction and payment of
§ 6700 penalty in separate and undisclosed closing agreement.)
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in drafting the consent language to avoid the effect of collateral estoppel.' 17
In the event the government litigated the issue of penalty conduct in the
injunction action and lost on that issue, the prevailing injunction defendant
could assert collateral estoppel to bar subsequent imposition of the underlying
penalty.18 However, a person contesting the penalty on the same facts but
who was not a defendant to the injunction proceeding which determined the
issue of penalty conduct may not raise collateral estoppel against the
Government to bar relitigation of the issue as it may apply to him.1 9
b. Exposure to Subsequent Suit By Investors
Collateral estoppel may also operate in a subsequent litigation brought by
an investor or other private party seeking rescission or damages under federal
or state securities laws. 20 On the other hand, the defendant may avoid collat-
eral estoppel by consenting to entry of an injunction without funding of fact
by the court, such consent order constitutes no presentation or adjudication
of the issue and collateral estoppel therefore does not apply.' 2'
117 See Section II.C. [4], infra.
118 See Montana v. United States, supra; United States v. Stauffer Chemical Company, U.S.
,52 U.S.L.W. 4022 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 10, 1984). United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236 (1924).
119 United States v. Mendoza, U.S. ,52 U.S. L.W. 4019 (Sup. Ct. Jan 10, 1984) Though
the Supreme Court conditionally approved the nonmutual offensive use of collateral estoppel in
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 332 (1979) and had long abandoned the requirement of
materiality of parties, Blonder- Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402
U.S. 313 (1971), the Court in Mendoza limited application of offensive nonmutual collateral
estoppel to private litigants. The Court's holding would appear to apply the exception for the
United States to all nonmutual estoppel whether defensive and "offensive" application. 52 U.S.
L.W. at 4021. Offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a plaintiff seeks to foreclose a
defendant from relitigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in
another action against the same or a different party. Defensive use of collateral estoppel occurs
when a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from relitigating an issue the plaintiff has previously
litigated unsuccessfully in another action against the same or a different party. Parklane Hosiery,
supra, at 326 n. 4.
120 Cf., Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (defendant prevented from
reiterating before a jury issues previously decided against him in a non-jury SEC injunctive
action); Phillips & Hanback, Remedies for Defrauded Purchasers, 12 Rev. Sec. Reg. 593 (1979);
Pickholz & Brodsky, An Assessment of Collateral Estoppel and SEC Enforcement Proceedings
After Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 28 Am. U.L. Rev. 37 (1978). See Haft, Limited Partners'
Remedies for Misrepresentation in Tax Shelters, 1 Tax Shelt. Invest. L. Rep. 65 (1982).
Indeed, the legislative history to Section 6700 notes the utility of an action under § 6700 to
private investors seeking recourse against the promoters under the securities laws: "[i]f the Inter-
nal Revenue Service establishes fraud by a promoter, the investors may be materially aided in
their efforts to seek rescision of the contracts under which they invested." 1982 Senate Report,
supra note 14, at 266 reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1014; 1982 Joint
Comm. Explanation, supra note 50, at 210-11.
121 See Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F. 2d. 887, 893-94 (2d. Cir. 1976) (com-
plaint which resulted in a consent judgment may not be properly cited in plaintiff's pleadings
because the consent decree results from private bargaining rather than true adjudication of the
underlying issues); Benoay v. Decker, 517 F. Supp. 490, 496 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (court deemed
irrelevant a consent order against certain defendants because consent order represents no presen-
tation of the issues); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, §
4443 (1981 & Supp. 1982). See Section II.C. [4], infra. Compare Final Judgement of Permanent
Injunction, US. v. Robert Krupp et al., No. 84-1327 RMT (Gx) (C.D. Calif. May 24, 1984)
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c. Subsequent Criminal Prosecution
A prospective injunction defendant may also be the target of a criminal
investigation. As to the application of collateral estoppel in subsequent crimi-
nal proceedings, if the Government prevails in an injunction or penalty
action, the defendant is free to relitigate the adverse findings of fact in a
subsequent criminal trial without bar by collateral estoppel because of the
higher standard of proof applicable in criminal actions. 23 If the Government
lost the preceding injunction or penalty action, its ability to proceed with the
criminal prosecution based on the same issues may be irreparably damaged. 24
(promoter consent to injunction under Section 7408 without admitting or denying Governments'
allegations in connection with a tax shelter based on leasing of master recordings). In Krupp the
court granted substantial injunctive and ancillary relief based on carefully limited findings of
facts. The Final Judgment reads in part:
1. The court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to Sections
1340 and 1345 of Title 28 of the United States Code, and Sec-
tions 7402 and 7408 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended (26 U.S.C.).
2. The Court finds that defendants have neither admitted nor
denied the Governments' allegation that they have engaged in
conduct subject to penalty under Section 6700 of the Internal
Revenue Code and which interferes with the enforcement of the
internal revenue laws.
3. The Court finds that defendants have consented to the entry
of judgment for injunctive relief pursuant to Sections 7402 and
7408 of the Internal Revenue Code to prevent defendants from
(i) engaging in conduct that is subject to penalty under Section
6700 of the Internal Revenue Code, and (ii) organizing, promot-
ing or selling the tax shelters known as Fact-to-Face, One-on-
One, Computronics, Ltd., Videotronics, Ltd. and Mediatronics,
Ltd.
Cf., IB J. Moore's Federal Practice 0. 444 [3] at 806 (2d. ed. 1983) Some commentators are of
the view that collateral estoppel should not apply when the prior judgment was reached by
consent even if findings were made in entering judgment since the consent procss presupposes
that there was no "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the issues fo that collateral estoppel
should operate to bar subsequent litigation of the issue. Id. See also lB Moore's Federal Practice,
0.418 [1] at 707-08 (2d. ed. 1983).
122 See Section II.B. infra. [7].
123 Adverse findings of fact in a civil proceeding to not bind the defendant in a subsequent
criminal case because of the lesser standard of proof applicable in the civil proceeding. See
United States v. Beery, 678, F. 2d. 856, 868 n. 10 (10th Cir. 1982). See also United States v.
Koenig, 388 F. Supp. 670, 719-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Moreover, if the criminal case will often be based on different facts and involve different
issues. See United States v. Mumford, 630 F. 2d. 1023, 1027-28 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1041 (1981). For example, if the subject conduct of the injunction action was overeva-
luation of the tax shelter asset, findings of facts as to valuation would not likely be elements in
the criminal prosecution. Criminal prosecution are generally reserved for egregious cases involv-
ing traditional badges of fraud such as false, altered, or backdated documents or false representa-
tions as to material facts on the text return, and to date have not centered around valuation
issues alone. See, e.g., United States v. Drape, 668 F. 2d. 22 (1st Cir. 1982) (backdated docu-
ments to avoid "at risk" provisions); United States v. Baskes, 649 F. 2d. 471 (7th Cir. 1980)
(fraudulent transactions carried out through sham trust), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1000 (1981);
United States v. Crum, 529 F. 2d. 1380 (9th Cir. 1976) (assistance in preparation of knowingly
false income tax returns).
124 See Dranow v. United States, 307 F. 2d. 545, 556, (8th Cir. 1962) (where both civil and
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If the order of proceedings is reversed so that the criminal prosecution
precedes an action for injunction (or penalty), a conviction will estop relitiga-
tion of facts decided in the criminal trial.125 Conversely, a defendant's prior
acquittal will not bar the Government from raising the common issues anew
in a subsequent civil action. 26
7. Concurrent Criminal Investigation
A promoter who is under investigation for possible injunctive action under
Section 7408 or penalty under Section 6700 or Section 6701 may also be
under criminal investigation. 27 While the Service has historically suspended
civil enforcement actions that might conflict with an ongoing criminal inves-
tigation or prosecution, 28 this general policy has been reevaluated in the con-
text of Section 7408 injunctions 29 and concurrent investigations appear con-
criminal actions have as their object "punishment," collateral estoppel applies). Cf. United States
Y. Mumford, 630 F. 2d. 1023, 1027 (4th Cir. 1980) (criminal action might be barred where it
raises same cause of action and issues as the unsuccessful civil action).
125 See, e.g., Gray v. Commissioner, F. 2d. (6th Cir. 1983),
Amos v. Commissioner, 360 F. 2d. 358 (4th Cir. 1965) (collateral estoppel aplies to issue of
fraud in a subsequent civil action brought by tacpayer who had earlier been convicted of eva-
sion); Moore v. United States, 360 F. 2d. 353 (4th Cir. 1965) (taxpayer's earlier criminal convic-
tion supplies basis for a finding of fraud in subsequent civil proceeding), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1001 (1967); Tomlinson v. Leflcowitz, 334 F. 2d. 262, 264 (4th Cir. 1964) (issue resolved against
defendant in criminal prosecution may not be contested by the same taxpayer ina civil suit
brought by the government), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965); Armstrong v. United States, 354
F. 2d. 274, 291 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (same); Arctic Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 68,
75076 (1964) (collateral estoppel also applies where basis of earlier conviction was a quilty
plea). See M. Saltzman, IRS Practice and Procedure 7.08(2) (b) (1981).
124 See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Neaderland v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 532
(1969), aff'd on other grounds, 424 F. 2d. 639 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970).
"[t]he difference in the legal rules relating to the burden of proof prevents estoppel from applying
because the acquittal is merely an adjudication that the proof was not sufficient to overcome all
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant." M. Saltzman, IRS Practice and Procedure,
7.09(2) (b) (1981).
127 See Section II.C. [1][B][ii], infra.
2I Cf., SEC Y. Dresser Industries, Inc., 628 F. 2d. 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied 449
U.S. 517 (1980). See Int. Rev. Manual-I Administration (CCH) §P-4-84 (1977). The Internal
Revenue Manual provides:
The purpose of criminal tax investigations is to enforce the tax
laws and to encourage voluntary compliance. Experience has
demonstrated that attempts to pursue both the criminal and the
civil aspects of a case concurrently may jeopardize the successful
completion of the criminal case. It is, therefore, necessary in the
overall interests of enforcement of the law, to identify those
instances when criminal actions generally will take precedence
over the civil aspects.
[T]he consequences of civil enforcement actions on the criminal
investigation and prosecution [of the] case should be carefully
weighed, and in general, only such actions will be taken as the
[Division Chiefs or the District Director] agree should be taken.
Id.
129 See Moore, "DOJ Consent Order May Sting Shelter Promoters," Legal Times, Feb. 7,
1983, at 17 (quoting Assistant Attorney General for the Tax Division, Glenn L. Archer, Jr.);
Remarks of B. John Williams, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, U.S. Dept.
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sistent with the language of the statute.1 30
There exists no legal impediment, constitutional or otherwise, to concur-
rent criminal and civil investigations,' 3' but concurrent investigations present
pitfalls for both prospective defendants and the government. For example,
information developed by the government in its criminal investigation may
be used to develop its civil case against a defendant. 32 The prospective crim-
inal defendant risks self-incrimination in defending himself in the civil
action. 133 Courts generally have not stayed civil injunction proceedings to
protect defendants' claims of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 134
One of the Government's primary concerns in the case of parallel investi-
gations is the defendant's use of broad civil discovery in the injunction case to
obtain information relevant to the possible criminal prosecution. The
Government may seek to limit discovery to only that evidence relevant in the
injunction action and not permit wholesale discovery of its criminal case. 135
of Justice, before the Philadelphia Bar Assn., Section of Taxation, Annual Meeting (Nov. 7,
1983), reported in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 216, G-5 (Nov. 7, 1983).
130 See Code Section 7408. Section 7408 provides in pertinent part: "The court may exercise
its jurisdiction over such action (as provided in § 7402(a)) separate and apart from any other
action brought by the United States against such person." Id. § 7408(a).
131 See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1970) (federal law enforcement would be
stifled if governmental agencies were required either to defer civil proceedings pending the out-
come of a criminal trial or to forego criminal prosecution once civil relief is sought); Standard
Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 52 (1912) (under the Sherman Act, criminal
anc civil proceedings may be brought simultaneously or successively at the government's discre-
tion); SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F. 2d. 1368, 1375 (D.C. Cir.) (Constitution does not
ordinarily require a stay of civil proceedings pending the outcome of criminal proceedings), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980). See also Donaldson Y. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971) (Service
summons upheld in an investigation that was likely to lead to civil liability as well as criminal
prosecution).
132 See United States Y. Chemical Bank, 593 F. 2d. 451, 456 (2d. Cir. 1979); United States v.
Cleveland Trust Co., 474 F. 2d. 1234 (6th Cir.) (per curiaum), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866
(1973). However, grand jury material would not be available for use in an injunction investiga-
tion in which litigation has not yet commenced. See United States v. Baggot, 103 S. Ct. 3164
(1983). See also United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 3133 (1983). Additionally,
once referral of the criminal case is made to the Department of Justice for prosecution, any civil
investigation by means of administrative summons must be suspended. See Code Section
7602(c). Cf., United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978) (Service summons under
§ 7602 not enforceable unless issued prior to Service's recommendation that criminal proceed-
ings be initiated); SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F. 2d. at 1377-84.
133 See generally Pickholz, The Expanding World of Parallel Proceedings, 53 Temp. L.Q. 1100
(1980).
134 See SEC v. Gilbert, 79 F.R.D. 683, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (defendant not put to an uncon-
stitutionally coercive choice where only immediate sanction for refusal to testify in civil case is
possible raising of adverse inference which would not, standing alone, support a finding of
liability).
135 See SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F. 2d. 1328, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (courts must be
cautious in granting discovery requests in concurrent civil and criminal proceedings so as not to
expand discovery rights of criminal defendant); Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F. 2d. 478 (5th Cir.
1962) (taxpayers who had sued for refunds could not discover special agent's reports), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963). Accord Founding Church of Scientology v. Kelley, 77 F.R.D. 378,
380 (D.D.C. 1977) (litigants should not be allowed to use liberal civil action discovery proce-
dures to avoid criminal discovery restrictions and thus obtain documents they might not other-
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8. Scope and Form of Relief
After a court makes the requisite findings that penalty conduct has
occurred and that injunctive relief is appropriate to precent recurrence of
such conduct, or otherwise accepts jurisdiction to enter an injunction, as in
the case of a consent decree, the court must address the nature and scope of
the injunctive relief to be granted. The legislative history of section 7408
views broadly the court's discretion as to the scope of the relief.136 For exam-
ple, even though the injunction may have been predicated on only one type
of section 6700 conduct, the court may enjoin all future conduct proscribed
by section 6700-both false or fraudulent statements and gross valuation
overstatements. 137 A more difficult question is whether a court may enjoin
not only future section 6700 conduct, but also a promoter's involvement in
legitimate tax shelter activity as a means "appropriate to prevent recurrence
of [section 6700] conduct."138 A comparable provision, Code Section 7407
authorizing injunction of tax return preparers for prohibited conduct, explic-
itly grants the court power to enjoin a person from further acting as a tax
return preparer, including engaging in legitimate preparer activities. 39 The
legislative history of Section 7408 appears at least implicitly to sanction such
wise be entitled to use in criminal case). But cf., Dellinger Y. Mitchell, 442 F. 2d. 782, 787 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (where related criminal proceeding is pending, civil action need not be halted entirely
but is subject to some limitations, including discovery protective orders, to avoid unfairness or
interference with the public interest).
136 "An injunction granted under this provision may prohibit the person enjoined from engag-
ing in any activity subject to penalty under new section 6700." 1982 Senate Report, supra at
269, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1017, See e.g., United States v. White,
84-1 U.S.T.C. para 9441 (D. Minn. May 1, 1984); United States v. Jones, 83-2 U.S.T.C. para
9471, 53 A.F.T.R. 2d. 84-370; United States v. Buttorff, supr; United States v. Hutchinson, 51
A.F.T.R. 2d. 83-1141 (S.D. Calif. April 6, 1983).
137 In United States v. Hutchinson, 83-1 U.S. T.C. para. 9322 (S.D. Cal. 1983), the defendant,
a promoter of a family trust scheme, consented to the entry of a Section 7408 injunction on the
basis of alleged false or fraudulent statements. The court order, besides granting other relief,
enjoined the defendant from "assisting in the organization of, or participating in the sale of
interests in, any partnership, trust, entity, investment plan or other plan or arrangement to the
extent conduct related thereto is subject to penalty under Code Section 6700." Id, See also
United States Y. White, supra; United States Y. Buttorff supra; United States v. Jones, supra.
138 See Code Section 7408 (b) (2).
139 See id. Code Section 7407 (b). Section 7407 (b) provides in relevant part:
If the court finds that an income tax return preparer has continu-
ally or repeatedly engaged in any conduct described in subpara-
graphs (A) through (D) of this subsection and that an injunction
prohibiting such conduct would not be sufficient to prevent such
person's interference with the proper administration of this title,
the court may enjoin such person from acting as an income tax
return preparer.
See U.S. v. Savoie, No. 84-1043 (W.D. La.) (Gov't complaint filed April 16, 1984) (injunction
suit filed seeking relief under 7402, 7407 and 7408 against tax protester leader asks court to bar
defendant from any future preparation of tax returns whether or not legitimate); US. v. Shugar-
man, et al, No. 85-64-NN (E.D. Va.) (Gov't complaint filed April 16, 1984) (injunction suit
filed seeking relief under 7402, 7407, and 7408 against tax protester organize associated with
nationwide "Patriots" protester group asks Court to bar defendants from engaging in all tax
return preparation); U.S. v. Oaks, No. 84-0349-CV-W-9 (W.D. Mo.) (Gov't complaint filed
Mar. 19, 1984).
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broad relief in appropriate cases. 40
The specific nature of ancillary relief granted under Section 7408 appears
limited only by the imagination of counsel and the discretion of the court.
The legislative history of Section 7408 provides that a court should exercise
"great latitude" in fashioning the specific form of equitable relief.' 4' For
example in United States v. Packaging Industries Group, Inc., 42 the general
partner and principal individual promoter of an allegedly abusive tax shelter
consented, along with ten other defendants, to an injunction under Code Sec-
tion 7408. As part of the settlement, the general partner agreed to notify the
Service of his future tax shelter activity and to provide the Service, upon
request, with the names of investors in any future tax shelter in which he
might participate. 43 Similar but more specific relief was granted in the Final
Judgment in United States v. Krupp et al.'44
140 The Senate Finance Committee report states: "Of course, the court will continue to have
full authority to act under its general jurisdiction (section 7402) and will continue to possess the
great latitude inherent in equity jurisdiction to fashion appropriate equitable relief." 1982 Senate
Report, supra at 269, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1017.
141 See id. Compare Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1779 (1976).
142 No 83-2307-N (D. Mass. 1983).
143 See Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction as to Richard Roberts (entered Aug. 9,
1983), Packaging Indus. Group, Inc., No. 83-2307-N (D. Mass, 1983). The court order
provides:
[I]f Richard Roberts organizes, assists in the organization of or
participates in the sale of any tax shelter as defined in § 6661(b)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.) and Regula-
tions promulgated thereunder, Richard Roberts shall promptly
notify the Internal Revenue Service (through the District Direc-
tor of the Internal Revenue District wherein Richard Roberts
resides) of his participation in the organization or sale of such tax
shelter and provide the District Director with complete and true
copies of all offering documents and other promotional material
with respect to the tax shelter, and upon the request of the Dis-
trict Director, provide the Internal Revenue Service with the
names, addresses and social security numbers of each person who
acquires an interest in such tax shelter.
144 No. 84-1327 RMT (GX) (C.D. Calif. May 24, 1984) (injunction of shelter based onleasing
of audio recording masters entered by consent, without admitting or denying the Government's
allegations, of individual and corporate defendants). The judgment provides relevant part:
5. It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that if any of the defendants, acting individually or through any
corporation now in existence or hereafter formed, in which he or
it is the controlling shareholder, or if any of the defendants acting
indirectly in any other manner, organizes, assists in the organiza-
tion of, or participates in the sale of any tax shelter, as defined in
paragraph 6 below, such defendant shall:
A. Prominently disclose the existence and nature of this
Order in any and all materials or media used to offer for sale
such tax shelter; and shall promptly;
B. Notify the Internal Revenue Service (through the Dis-
trict Director of the Internal Revenue Service wherein the par-
ticular defendant resides) of his or its participation in the organi-
zation or sale of such tax shelter;
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C. Provide the District Director with complete and true
copies of all offering documents, appraisals, tax opinions, and
other promotional material with respect to the tax shelter;
D. Wait a period of 30 days from the date such material is
delivered to the District Director before beginning the sale of
such tax shelter; and
E. Refrain from making any claim or statement that such
notification or any failure by the Internal Revenue Service to
comment or take action with respect to the material implies
approval of the tax shelter by the Internal Revenue Service.
6. A "tax shelter." as the term is used in paragraph 5, above, is
an investment which has as a significant feature for Federal
income or excise tax purposes either of the following attributes:
A. Deductions in excess of income from the investment
being available in any year to reduce income from other sources
in that year, or
B. Credits in excess of the tax attributable to the income
from the investment being available in any year to offset taxes on
income from other sources in that year.
7. It is further ORDERED, ADJUSTED AND DECREED
that this Court shall retain jurisdiction of this action for the pur-
pose of implementing and enforcing [sic] this Final Judgment
and all additional decrees and orders necessary and appropriate
to the public interest. The provisions of Paragraph 5 shall be in
effect for a term of five years from the date entered, unless the
United States files a notice no earlier than 180 days nor less than
60 days before expiration, stating the reasons why the best inter-
ests of the United States require an extension of these provisions.
In such case, the Court may continue these provisions in accord
with the public interest.
Definitions of "tax shelter" for purposes of notification to IRS of future offerings vary. In Pack-
aging Industries, the definition was merely made with reference to Code Section 6661 while in
Krupp the definition was made more specific and thus less limiting to the defendant. In other
injunction actions the even more specific language has been used to define "tax shelter" for this
purpose. See e.g. U.S. v. North American Investment Group, Ltd et al., No. 04-C-3683-H
(Government complaint filed April 30, 1984) (promoters and related accountant name defend-
ants in injunction suit with respect tax shelter based on rehabilitation credit for real estate). In
North American the Government prayer for relief seeking in part to require notification to the
Service of future tax shelter offerings by defendants defines "tax shelter" for that purpose as:
[A]n investment which has as a significant feature for federal
income or excise tax purposes either of the following attributes:
(1) Deductions in excess of income from the investment being
available in any year to reduce income from other sources in that
year, or (2) credits in excess of the tax attributable to that
income from the investment being available in any year to offset
taxes on income from other sources in that year. Excluded from
the term are: municipal bonds, annuities, qualified retirement
plans, individual retirement accounts; stock option plans; securi-
ties issued in a corporate reorganization; and real estate where it
is anticipated that deductions are unlikely to exceed gross income
from the investment in any year, and that any tax credits are
unlikely to exceed the tax on the income from that source in any
year.
This definition substantially tracks the definition of "tax shelter" contained in Treas. Dept. Circu-
lar 230 for purposes of regulating the issurance of legal opinions in tax shelter investments. See
note 33, supra.
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In addition to relief requiring the enjoined parties to no longer engage in
conduct subject to Section 6700 generally and requiring future notification to
IRS of future tax shelter offerings the Government has sought other forms of
ancillary relief including (i) agreement of the promoter to notify investors
and salesmen of the injunction and provide IRS with names and addresses of
investors and salesmen for both present and prior shelters, 45 (ii) pay a
penalty under Section 6700, (often specified in separate and undisclosed clos-
ing agreement)' 4" (iii) offering investors the opportunity to rescind their
investment with the promoter 47 and (iv) providing written notice of the
injunction inall future investment offerings.' 48
In one injunction suit lodged against a tax protest leader, the Government
has requested relief in the form of requiring the defendant to halt publication
of a newsletter. 49 In addition, in some injunction suits brought by the United
States under Section 7408, the government has also placed jurisdiction and
sought injunctive and ancillary relief under Code Section 7407 relating to
injunction of return preparers. 5 0 In these cases the Government has also
sought, in addition to other relief, to prohibit the defendant(s) from engaging
145 See e.g., United States v. Music Masters, Ltd et al, No. C-C-84-228-P (W.D.N.C.)
(Government complaint filed May 2, 1984); United States v. North American Investment Group,
Ltd et al, No. 84-C-3683-H (N.D. I1) (Government complaint April 30, 1984); United States v.
Wachter, et aL, No. 84-0883-C (2) (E.D. Mo.) (Government complaint filed April 16, 1984);
United States v. Van Zyl et al, No. 84-313-CIV-ORL-18 (M.D.F. Co.) (Government complaint
filed April 13, 1984); United States v. Dixon et aL, No. C-84-0747 MHP/TAX (N.D. Calif.)
(Government complaint filed Jan. 5, 1984); United States v. Computer Alternatives, et al, No.
C-84-1032 (N.D. Calif. March 6, 1984) (final judgment against defendants entered pursuant to
their consent without admitting or denying Government allegations).
'4 United States v. Krupp, et aL, No. 84-1327 RMT(GX) (C.D. Calif. May 24, 1984) (leasing
of master recordings) (promoter consent without admitting or denying Government allegations)
(undisclosed amount of § 6700 penalties settled by separate dosing agreement); United States v.
Day, et aL, No. C-84-563A (N.D. Ga. Mar. 20, 1984) (computer leasing shelter) (promoter
consent without admitting or denying Government's allegations) (includes $36,000 in total §
6700 penalties imposed as to two defendants, penalty waived as to third defendant); United
States v. Computer Alternatives, et al, No. C-841032 (N.D. Calif. March 6, 1984) (computer
leasing shelter) (consent of promoters and salesmen without admitting or denying Government's
allegations) (includes payment of $50,000 in § 6700 penalties); United States v. Mid-American
Consultants, Inc., et al, No. 83-2662 C(3) (E.D. Mo. Nov. 23, 1983) (interest accrual real estate
time-sharing shelter) (promoter consent without admitting or denying Government's allegations)
(includes payment of $438,000 in § 6700 penalty); United States v. Packaging Industries Group,
Inc., et al., No. 83-2307-N (D. Mass. Aug. 8, 1983) (equipment leasing shelter) (promoters and
attorney consent without admitting or denying Government's allegations) (includes payment of
$451,000 in § 6700 penalty by central corporate defendant).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Clark, et al., No. C-84-0421 J (D. Utah) (Government complaint
filed May 10, 1984); United States v. Music Master, Ltd., et al, supra.
148 See, e.g., United States v. Krupp, et al, supra, (judgment entered by consent of the defend-
ants without admitting or denying allegations of Government complaint); U.S. v. Clark, supra,
U. S. v. North American Investment Group, Ltd, supra
14- United States v. Oaks, No. 84-0348-CV-W-9 (W.D. Mo.) (Government complaint filed
Mar. 19, 1984) (injunction suit seeking relief under Section 7402, 7407 and 7408 against tax
protester lender and editor of protester newsletter John A. Oaks). Cf. SEC v. Lowe, F.
2d. (2d. Cir. Jan. 18, 1984) (count injunction of defendant's publication of investment
advice newsletter in suit by SEC held not barred by the First Amendment).
150 Code Section 7407. See United States v. Ernst & Whinney, supra.
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in improper activities as tax return preparers'5 and in some cases, primarily
those best described as involving "tax protester" defendants, sought to enjoin
the defendant(s) from engaging in future return preparation completely
regardless of whether the activity would be legitimate or abusive. 5 2
151 United States v. North American Investment Group, Ltd, supra,; United States v. Wachter,
supra, Cf., United States v. Hutchinson, 51 A.F.T.R. 2d. 1141 (S.D. Calif. 1983); United States
v. Jones, 53 A.F.T.R. 2d. 370, 83-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9741 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
152 United States v. Savoie, supra; United States v. Shugarman, supra; U.S. v. Oaks,
supra.
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C. Implementation of the TEFRA Abusive Tax Shelter Provisions
1. IRS Procedures for Identification and Examination of Abusive
Tax Shelters
[A] Prior to TEFRA
Prior to TEFRA, the IRS had little if any effective capacity to monitor
current tax shelter offerings. Investigatory resources and manpower focused
almost exclusively on examination of taxpayer returns.' Being return-based,
the Service's institutional experience and knowledge was limited to prior year
tax shelters. Any knowledge possessed by the Service of a promoter's current
activities was purely coincidental and unspecific.
However, with the enactment of Sections 6700 and 7408 in TEFRA, the
focus of enforcement has changed from audit of prior year(s) shelter at the
investor level to interdiction of current offerings at the promoter level. The
Service has instituted new procedures to implement the change in focus.2
[B] After TEFRA: A "Front End" Approach
[i] Identification of Abusive Offerings
To implement the TEFRA tax shelter provisions, particularly the abusive
tax shelter promoter penalty and injunction provisions, Code Sections 6700
and 7408, the Internal Revenue Service has instituted new procedures aimed
at identifying and responding to abusive tax shelters before investing taxpay-
ers file their returns. Revenue Procedure 83-78, 1983-2 C.B. 595, sets forth
the new procedures and standards the Service will follow in identifying and
reacting to abusive tax shelters.
Under the guidelines outlined in Rev. Proc. 83-78, each of the 63 IRS
Districts nationwide is to have a committee to review potentially abusive tax
shelters being currently promoted in that district. The committee is to select
those offerings which, based on the preliminary information available to the
Committee, meet the criteria for imposition of any of the following: (1) the
promoter penalty under Code Section 6700; (2) institution of an action for
injunction under Section 7408; or (3) the sending of pre-filing notification
letters to investors.3 The three main administrative branches of the IRS are
represented on each district committee: District Counsel, Criminal Investiga-
tions Division and the Examination Division. A coordinator for the commit-
tee gathers information on potential targets from any source of opportunity
' See Slaughter, supra, at 5-8, 39.
2 Rev. Proc. 83-78, 1983-2 C.B. 595.
3 Rev. Proc. 83-78, 1983-2 C.B. 595, Section 3.03. For elements needed to establish liability
under Sections 6700 and 7408, see Sections II A. and B., supra. As to investor pre-filing notifica-
tions, see Section II D., infra. In addition, since conduct subject to penalty under Code Section
6701 has been added as actionable conduct under Section 7508, presumably the scope of inves-
tigations under Rev. Rule 83-78 will be expanded accordingly. Code Section 6701 imposes a
penalty for aiding and abetting in the understatement of another's tax liability. See Section III B.,
infra.
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including federal, state and local information agencies, other IRS investiga-
tions (civil or criminal), magazines and newspapers.4 In selecting current tax
shelter offerings for examination, the committee is to consider such factors as
the past involvement of the shelter's promoter and other related persons in
prior year shelters; the type of shelter involved; the number of investors
involved, the potential revenue loss.5 Obviously, selection of a particular
offering for examination will be more likely if the promoter is thought to
have engaged in previous abusive promotions.6
[ii] Examination of Targeted Offerings
Once the committee selects a shelter based on available preliminary infor-
mation, a revenue agent then conducts a formal examination of the promoter.
The stated purpose of the examination is not only to determine whether
penalty for promotion of an abusive tax shelter under Code Section 6700
should be imposed or injunctive relief under Code Section 7408 sought but
also merely whether "there is a basis for concluding that the investors will
not be in compliance with the tax laws if they claim the tax benefits repres-
ented by the promoter to be available."' 7 Thus, the examination is general in
scope and not restricted only to whether the shelter comes with the scope of
Sections 6700 and 7408 as an "abusive" tax shelter.
At commencement of the examination, a revenue agent is to contact the
promoter of the selected shelter by letter informing the promoter of the exam-
ination and advising that the Service is considering possible penalties and
injunctive action under Section 6700 and 7408 and pre-filing notification to
investors.' The letter may also request documents and records which the
promoter has 10 days to make available for examination. The letter also is to
inform the promoter that he will be afforded an opportunity to meet with
the revenue agent and an IRS attorney to offer any facts and legal arguments
to establish that the selected shelter's claimed benefits comply with the tax
laws.10
With the records obtained from the promoter (either voluntarily or by
summons) and any third party information available, the agent conducts the
4 Rev. Proc. 83-78, Section 3.01. For example, though developed and litigated prior to pro-
mulgation of Rev. Proc. 83-78, the injunction in United States Y. Buttorff, supra was obtained
based in part on evidence supplied by the Texas State Bar which was conducting an investigation
of Buttorff for unauthorized practice of law.
5 Rev. Proc. 83-78, Section 3.02.
6 Past history is particularly relevant when developing information for an action seeking
injunctive relief under Section 7408 since an element and predicate to issuance of an injunction
is that "injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent recurrence." See Section I. B. [3], supra.
7 Rev. Proc. 83-78, Section 3.03.
8 Rev. Proc. 83-78, Section 4.02.
9 Id A 10-day return date may be woefully inadequate if the request for records is lengthy or
technical issues are implicated. In the event the promoter fails to comply with the request, the
agents may issue a summons for the records. Id
10 Id
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examination. If in the course of the examination, the agent determines there
are indications of fraud (e.g., backdating of documents), the case is to be
referred to the Criminal Investigations Division for its review." In the event
the Criminal Investigations Division finds evidence of criminal violations, the
investigation will then be conducted from that point as a "joint" investigation
by Criminal Investigations Division, represented by a special agent, and the
Examination Division, represented by the assigned revenue agent. As a prac-
tical matter, this no doubt means a special agent would then lead any con-
tinued investigation and any criminal implications in the case would assume
top priority.'2
The conference, between the IRS and the target promoter, is apparently
held after the agent's examination is completed but before formal recommen-
dations are made to the District Director. 3 Besides providing the promoter
the opportunity to present any defenses or mitigating facts, the conference
may provide the promoter an opportunity to learn the Service's views on the
shelter. It may also serve as the starting point for settlement negotiations. The
conference procedure as outlined in the Revenue Procedure is very restrictive.
Rev. Proc. 83-78 provides that, except in unusual circumstances, no exten-
sions of time will be granted on the meeting date and only one meeting will
be afforded.' 4 Thus, the promoter may have to defend his position to the IRS
without any advance notice of the specific nature of the Service's concerns
and no stated opportunity for additional meetings if clarification or follow-up
is needed."1
The limited nature of the conference opportunity at this stage'6 emphasizes
the importance of an orderly and competent presentation of views at the
conference. The promoter, represented by counsel,' 7 should consider making
1 Rev. Proc. 83-78, Section 4.03.
12 Cf., U.S. v. Virgil Lovell, No. 83-308-A (N.D. Ga.) (indictment of promoter for attempted
bribery of IRS agent investigating shelter for possible injunctive action under Section 7408). See
Section II. B. [7], supra. (concurrent criminal investigation of a prospective injunction
defendant).
13 Rev. Proc. 83-78, Sections 4.02 and 4.04.
'4 Rev. Proc. 83-78, Section 5.02.
'5 These requirements have been criticized as too strict. See Sanders, J. of Tax. of
Investments 269, 273 (1984).
Ws See Section II. E., infra, discussing conference opportunities with the Department of Justice
after referral of case to the Department by the Internal Revenue Service for institution of suit for
injunction.
17 Counsel for the promoter must consider whether they may themselves by a target in the
investigation since penalty and injunctive relief under Sections 6700 and 7408 encompass attor-
neys as well as the direct promoter. Cf., Rev. Proc. 83-78, Section 8.02. See Sections II. A. [2],
supra. For example, there is a clear conflict of interest where counsel in the enforcement con-
troversy is also the author of target shelter's tax opinion. This raises the additional issue of
whether other possible targets of in the examination (attorneys, accountants, appraisers, etc.)
who might also be subject to penalty or injunction should also be afforded a conference oppor-
tunity with the Service. The guidelines of Rev. Proc. 83-78 refer only to the promoter. However,
other parties, particularly those from which the Service obtained information in its investigation
arguably come within the scope of Rev. Proc. 83-78 and should be afforded a conference oppor-
tunity as well.
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a written presentation of defense and facts.' s A written submission makes a
record for the promoter which may be helpful in presenting his case to the
Service at higher levels of its review, particularly where difficult or technical
issues are presented. 9
After completion of the examination and conference with the promoter,
the agent and attorney working with the agent make their recommendations
to the District Director based on the following options: (1) assertion of the
Section 6700 penalty; (2) referral to the Department of Justice for institution
of suit for injunctive relief under Section 7408; and (3) issuance of pre-filing
notification letters to investors. 20
It is difficult to assess with any precision the impact of Rev. Proc. 83-78.21
However, a few instances of its application have been made public. In one
instance, a syndicator of tax shelter private placements based on computer
leasing was investigated by the Service under the new procedure.22 Though
no details of the reason for selection of the syndicators were given by either it
or the Service, a recent Tax Court decision had disallowed the tax benefits in
prior year offering of the syndicator on the grounds that the lease arrange-
ment at issue there had no business purpose. 23 This decision may have trig-
gered further investigation directed at current offerings of the syndicator. 24 In
a second publicized incident, another computer leasing syndicator announced
that the Service had examined its activities but found no basis for further
action.25 This latter instance is instructive because it demonstrates the Servi-
ce's willingness to use the Rev. Proc. 83-78 guidelines to examine offerings
which are not necessarily abusive.
D. Pre-filing Notification of Investors
In addition to determining whether a selected shelter is an appropriate
candidate for penalty or injunction under either (or both) Code Sections
6700 and 7408, Rev. Proc. 83-78 outlines a third option, pre-filing notifica-
tion whereby the Service notifies the shelter investors that they will be
audited if they claim the deductions or credits of the shelter on their returns. 26
1 In format, the written product should be similar to a ninety-day protest letter or a "Wells"
submission used in SEC enforcement proceedings at the administrative level. However, counsel
should be careful to set forth only facts which are accurate and, if possible, independently verify
facts. See notes 32 and 33 supra.
19 The examining agent and assigned District Counsel attorney who make recommendations to
the District Director may be the only IRS representative actually attending the conference. See
Rev. Proc. 83-78, Section 4.04.20 Rev. Proc. 83-78, Section 5.03.
21 Any investigation conducted under Rev. Proc. 83-78 is subject to disclosure restrictions.
Code Section 6103. Cf., First Western Government Securities, Inc. Y. United States, 578 F. Supp.
212 (D. Colo. 1984).
22 See Washington Post, Dec. 28, 1983, D7.
23 Rice's Toyota World v. Commissioner. 81 T.C. 184 (1983).
2A However, the opinion though disallowed the claimed tax benefits as lacking economic
reality stopped short of describing the offering at issue as an "abusive tax shelter"
25 Wall Street Journal, May 3, 1984, at 12.
26 Rev. Proc. 83-78, Section 6.
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Pre-filing notification is an extremely effective tool for the Service. Unlike
Sections 6700 and 7408, no judicial review or court order is required for its
application. Further, it may apply to a wider range of shelters than those
subject to penalty or injunction under Sections 6700 and 7408. Under Rev.
Proc. 83-78, the Service may utilize pre-filing notification for any tax shelter
that involves: "(1) overvaluation of assets, (2) false or fraudulent statements
as to a material matter; (3) an aberrational use of technical positions. '27
While the first two criteria roughly track the grounds under Section 6700,28
the Revenue Procedure cites only "Rules of 78's in time-sharing transactions"
as an example of "aberrational use of technical positions. '29 Rules of 78's and
similarly abusive interest accrual devices have been the object to Government
action for injunctive relief under Section 7408.30 The danger exists, however,
that the Service may construe the "aberrational use" standard to reach
beyond those abuses subject to sanction under Sections 6700 or 7408, and
apply pre-filing notifications to merely aggressive shelters despite its draco-
nian impact.3'
Despite the potentially disastrous consequences to a promoter of pre-filing
notification by the Service to the promoter's investors, 32 there is no provision
for obtaining review of the Service's decision to issue pre-filing notification to
investors of a targeted shelter under Rev. Proc. 83-78.33 Indeed, the Service
may issue the letters without notice to the promoter.34 At least two promoters
have sought to enjoin the Service from sending notification letters but both
27 Rev. Proc. 83-78, Section 6.01
28 See Sections II. [A] (4], supra.
29 Rev. Proc. 83-78, Section 6.01. "Rules of 78's" interest accrual is a tax shelter technique
used mostly in real estate shelters for inflating interest deductions. Calculating interest on long-
term seller financing using the sum-of-the-year's-digits method (popularly known as "Rule of
78's), coupled with a deferred balloon payment of accrued interest and principal, results in
accrual of most of the loan's interest in the early years of the loan while the provision for balloon
payment defers actual payment twenty or thirty years. An accrual method taxpayer's deduction
of the accrued but unpaid interest creates great tax advantage. But cf., Rev. Rul. 83-84, 1983-1
C.B. 97 (Rule of 78's interest accrual not a proper method of accounting for interest in indebted-
ness); Rev. Rul. 84-5, C.B. (Rules of 78's interest accrual in context of real estate
time-sharing tax shelter held improper method of calculating deductible interest).
30 See, e.g., United States v. Gilbralter Properties, Inc., et aL, No. 83-3-83-0641 (N.D. Tex.,
Aug. 15, 1983) (interest accrual real estate time-sharing tax shelter) (injunction entered by
defendant consent without admitting or denying Government allegations); United States v. Mid-
American Consultants, Inc., et aL, No. 83-2662-C(3) (E.D. Mo. Nov. 23, 1983) (interest accrual
real estate time-sharing tax shelter) (injunction entered by consent of defandant without admit-
ting or denying Government allegations; judgement includes payment of $38,000 in Section
6700 penalty); United States v. Clark, et aL, No. C-84-0421-J (complaint filed May 10, 1984, D.
Utah) (injunction sought against promoters of interest accrual time-sharing shelter).
31 See Note 25, supra and accompanying text.
32 Upon receipt of pre-filing notification, investors may refuse to make future scheduled capital
contributions or bring suit for recision or damages against the promoter for violation of the
securities law. The promoter also stands to lose future customers and suffer harm to reputation.
See, e.g., Sanders, IRS New Attacks on Tax Shiter Syndications, J. Tax. Investments 269,
273-274 (1984).




On the other hand, pre-filing notification is subject to an important practi-
cal limitation in that the Service must have the names and addresses of the
investors in order to notify them.36 It may obtain such information a number
of ways. It may be available as matter of public record as in the case of a
certificate or amended certificate of partnership recorded under state law, or
it may be made available voluntarily by the promoter cooperating with the
Service in a Rev. Proc. 83-78 examination.37 In the event the names are not
obtained from the promoter voluntarily or by other means, the Service may
issue a summons to the promoter,38 though in issuing a summons for this
purpose, it is unclear whether the summons must comply with the special
"John Doe" procedures requiring court approval to issue the summons.39
35 Mid-South Music Corp. v. United States, 83-2 U.S.T.C. 9710 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 2, 1983)
(appeal pending in the Sixth Circuit, No. 83-5867) (letters at issue were issued by District
Director before Rev. Proc. 83-78 issued); Phillips v. Internal Revenue Service, No. 84-1700
W.M.B.C. (PX) (C.D. Calif.) (stay denied by the Ninth Circuit). But cf., South Carolina v.
Regan, 52 A.F.T.R. 2d 84-732 (Sup. Ct. 1984). In South Carolina, the Supreme Court granted
South Carolina leave to file a complaint invoking original jurisdiction of the court and seeking
injunctive and other relief barring enforcement of certain provisions of TEFRA that impose
restrictions on tax-exempt bearer bonds issued by state and local governments. Code Section
103(a), providing that interest earned on state obligations is not subject to the federal income
tax, was amended by TEFRA to require that many state bonds be issued in registered, rather
than bearer form in order to qualify for the tax exemption provided in Section 103(a). South
Carolina maintains this Section is unconstitutional as violative of the Tenth Amendment and the
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. The Federal Government sought dismissal of the
State's action on the ground that the proposed suit was barred by the Anti-Injunctive Act, Code
Section 7421(a), which prohibits the maintenance by any person of any suit seeking to restrain
the assessment or collection of any tax.
The Supreme Court, in a divided opinion, held that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the
State's suit reasoning that the Act could not bar injunctive suits brought by nontaxpayers such as
the State here, when such third parties have no other recourse to obtain judicial review. See also
Foodservice and Lodging Institute, Inc. v. Regan, F. Supp. (D.C. D.C. Feb. 29,
1984) (Government motion to dismiss plaintiff's injunction suit to enjoin regulations imple-
menting tip income reporting requirements denied on the ground that plaintiff's members had no
adequate remedy at law to contest the regulations). After South Carolina, it would appear a
promoter may seek to enjoin the Service from issuing pre-filing notification letters to investors
and not be bound by Code Section 7421 since the promoter has no other recourse to challenge
the action. On the other hand, any such action must clear additional hurdles of standing, cf.,
Wright v. Regan, U.S. ( , 1984), 656 F. 2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1983), and
sovereign immunity, United State v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980); United States Sherwooi 312
U.S. 584 (1941); Rowe v. United States, 633 F. 2d 799 (9th Cir. 1980), Cert. denied, 451 U.S.
970 (1981).
36 Cf proposed legislation that will require promoters to maintain lists of shelter investors for
use by the Internal Revenue Service on request.
37 Rev. Proc. 83-78, Section 4.02.
3s Id
39 There is an intercircuit conflict which the Supreme Court will resolve on the issue of
whether the "John Doe" summons procedures of Section 7609 (requiring court approval for
issuance of the summons) must be complied with when the IRS seeks information from a person
such as a tax shelter promoter when that information will be used in examining not only the
served party (the promoter) but third parties (the investors) as well. Tiffany Fine Arts v. United
States, 718 F. 2d 7 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted 52 U.S.L.W. 3713 (April 3, 1984). Section
7609(f) provides that no John Doe summonses, used to determine the liability of unknown
taxpayers, may be issued prior to an ex parte judicial proceeding and approval by the district
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An investor in receipt of a pre-filing notification letter should be aware
that not only will deductions and credits of the targeted shelter be disallowed
if claimed, but the notification process opens up other items on his return for
review since under Rev. Proc. 83-78 the investor return will be handled by
normal audit procedures.40 It is unclear whether the investor's return will still
be singled out for audit on other items if the questioned shelter items are not
claimed. Since the IRS must check the investor's return to determine whether
the shelter items appear, the opportunity to review items unrelated to the
shelter presents itself.4'
In addition, thogh the notification procedure is described as "pre-filing,"
the Revenue Procedure indicates that letters may be issued after the filing of
returns by investors.42 Investors may file amended returns, but are still subject
to any applicable penalties, such as the understatement penalty, based on
their original return. 43
Lastly, a fourth option in addition to penalty or injunction under Sections
6700 and 7408 and pre-filing notification is merely audit of the shelter inves-
tor without pre-filing notification. Under this option, the promoter avoids the
hazards and harm caused by pre-filing notification while the Service is able to
develop its examination at the promoter level in accordance with the proce-
dures under Rev. Proc. 83-78 which it can then disseminate to various dis-
tricts for use in the individual investor audits."
E. Litigation of Penalty or Injunction Actions
1. Generally
When the Internal Revenue Service in accordance with guidelines
announced in Rev. Proc. 83-78, determines to seek injunctive relief under
Section 7408 with respect to an offering or promoter, it refers the actions to
the Tax Division of the Department of Justice for institution of suit. The Tax
court. In Tiffany Fine Arts, the Second circuit held that a "dual purpose" summons need not
satisfy the statutory conditions imposed by Section 7609(f) of the Internal Revenue Code with
respect to the issuance of "John Doe" summonses. In that case, the IRS issued ordinary (non-
John Doe) summonses under Code Section 7602 to Tiffany, a promoter of tax shelters, indicat-
ing that the Service was investigating Tiffany's own tax liabilities, but conceding that the infor-
mation requested could also serve to identify its clients. Accord, United States v. Gottlieb, 712 F.
2d 1363 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Barter Systems, Inc., 694 F. 2d 163 (8th Cir. 1982).
Contra, United States v. Thompson, 701 F. 2d 1175 (6th Cir. 1983).
40 Rev. Proc. 83-78, Section 7.02. In addition the investor's decision to claim the disputed
shelter deductions exposes not only the investor to the full range of penalties (civil fraud, negli-
gence, substantial understatement) but may also expose his tax return preparer to penalty under
6694 or 6701. See Section III. B., infra.
41 Rev. Proc. 83-78, Sections 7.01 and 8.01.
42 Rev. Proc. 83-78, Section 6.02.
43 Id
44 Nationwide dissemination of audit materials gained from audit of a promoter for use in
investor audits has been challenged but upheld by the courts. First Western Government Securi-
ties, inc. v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 212 (D. Colo. 1984) (court held no claim under Section
6103, barring disclosure of tax return information, stated by disclosure of IRS audit report of
promoters to the investors in disallowing their tax benefits).
TAX CONFERENCE
Division then holds responsibility for the conduct of the litigation.
4 5 Sim-
ilarly, Tax Division attorneys would defend any penalty imposed by the Ser-
vice under Section 6700 or 6701 since these penalties may only be contested
in federal district court. 6
2. Conference Opportunities with the Department of Justice
It appears that prospective section 7408 defendants will not be afforded a
conference with the Department of Justice as a matter of right.' 7 This is in
contrast to the conference opportunity described in discretionary terms but
virtually always granted in criminal tax cases. 48
The Justice Department discretionary approach in the injunction area
appears motivated by the concern that any mandatory conference procedures
would present prospective defendants with an opportunity to delay investiga-
tion and institute of suit. The same considerations resulted in the conference
policy now followed by the SEC in its civil enforcement actions including
injunction actions.49 The SEC policy is that the Commission staff, "in its
discretion, may advise prospective defendants or respondents of the general
nature of its investigation, including the indicated violations as they pertain to
them, and the amount of time that may be available for preparing a [Wells]
submission."50
45 The Department of Justice Tax Division represents the Internal Revenue Service and the
Department of Treasury in all litigation other than that before the United States Tax Court. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 515-19 (1976); 28 C.F.R. § 0.70 (1982).
46 Code Section 6703. See Section II. A. [5], supra.
47 See Remarks of B. John Williams, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, before Philadelphia Bar Assn., Section of Taxation, Annual Meeting
(Nov. 7, 1983), reported in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 216, 6-5 (Nov. 7, 1983). Mr. Williams
stated:
Because the Service will have afforded the promoter a con-
ference and an opportunity to present evidence that the Servi-
ce's suspicions are unfounded, the Tax Division will not as a
matter of course permit a conference with its attorneys [in §
7408 injunction cases], except to negotiate a consent decree. If
we believe that no useful purpose would be served by holding
a conference, none will be held.
This position has been strongly criticized by the tax bar. See W. John Moore, "DOJ Limits
Tax Conference Procedure", Legal Times, Vol. VI, No. 25, at 1 (Nov. 21, 1983). Cf., Comments
of Robert E. Davis, then Deputy Asst. Attorney General, Tax Division U. S. Department of
Justice, in W. John Moore, "IRS May Get Authority to Grant Immunity in Tax Investigations",
Legal Times, Vol. VI, No. 10, at 4 (Aug. 8, 1983).
48 The Criminal Section of the Tax Division may grant a conference request after referral of a
criminal case to the Department of Justice for prosecution. At the conference held in criminal
cases, the taxpayer and consel generally are informed of the alleged statutory violations, the years
involved, the unreported income and tax deficiencies under consideration and the method of
proof employed by the government. See United States Attorney Manual §6-2.140.
49 SEC Securities Release No. 5310, reprinted in 38 Fed. Reg. 5457 (Mar. 1, 1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Securities Act Release].
50 Securities Act Release, supra (emphasis added). A "Wells submission" is a letter or memo-
randum to the SEC setting forth the defendant's position as to the facts, the law or both. See
generally Handling an SEC Investigation 1980 (No. 357 P.L.I. 1980); Mathews, Effective
Defense of SEC Investigations: Laying the Foundation for Successful Disposition of Subsequent
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In practice, a prospective § 7408 injunction defendant will almost always
be granted a conference with the assigned Department of Justice attorney
prior to institution of suit if it is clear that the defendant is acting in good
faith and not using the conference opportunity to delay or hinder the
Government's consideration of the injunction suit. In rare instances, compell-
ing circumstances may make a conference impossible, as for example, if the
Service has requested and provided adequate factual foundation for seeking a
temporary restraining order. In this circumstance timing would dictate that
any contact between the Department and defendant(s) be limited. 51 In any
event, for the same reasons detailed as to mandatory conferences with the
IRS in its initial investigation, the prospective defendant and counsel should
seek a conference with the Department of Justice.5 2
3. Entry of Injunction by Consent
The overwhelming majority of actions brought under Section 7408 have
resulted in consent judgments prior to trial.53 This is not surprising in light of
SEC experience. The SEC has long used consent judgments to obtain injunc-
tions on negotiated terms. Indeed, the majority of SEC injunction actions are
Civi Administrative and Criminal Proceedings, 24 Emory L. J. 567, 618-28 (1975). In the early
1970's, an SEC advisory group, the "Wells Committee," named for its chairman, John A. Wells,
proposed that the SEC establish a formal conference procedure which would, except in limited
circumstances, afford persons under investigation two mandatory procedural rights prior to the
institution of any injunctive proceeding. A prospective defendant would have the right to be
notified of the probable charges facing him and the right to be heard by the SEC. See SEC
Advisory Committee, Report on Enforcement Policies and Practice (June 1, 1972) reprinted in
A. Mathews, B. Finkelstein & H. Milstein, Enforcement and Litigation Under the Federal Securi-
ties Laws-1973, 275, 279 (No. 116 P.L.I. 1973). The Commission, however, declined to adopt
any procedure that would impede its flexibility in responding to violations. The Commission's
formal response to the Committee's recommendation stated:
[The SEC] cannot place itself in a position where, as a result of
the establishment of formal procedural requirements, it would
lose its ability to respond to violative activities in a timely
fashion.
The Commission believes that the adoption of formal
requirements could seriously limit the scope and timeliness of
its possible action and inappropriately inject into actions it
brings issues, irrelevant to the merits of such proceedings, with
respect to whether or not the defendant or respondent had been
afforded an opportunity to be heard prior to the institution of
proceedings against him and the nature and extent of such
opportunity.
For example, the exception for egregious cases-"where the
nature of the case precludes'"-would create definitional prob-
lems through which defense counsel might delay enforcement
action to the detriment of the SEC and the public interest.
s' United States v. Joiner, et al, No. C-83-2780A (N.D. Ga. Government complaint filed Dec.
29, 1983) (Government motion for temporary restraining order denied after hearing).
52 See Section II. C. [1] [B] [ii], supra.
53 With few exceptions, e.g., United States v. Buttorff, supra (preliminary injunction entered
after evidentiary hearing), United States White, supra (preliminary injunction entered after hear-
ing) and United States v. Your Heritage Protection Society No. 84-0643-R (C.D. Calif. April 17,
1984) (injunction entered on Government's motion for summary judgment), the overwhelming
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settled by consent.54
Entering into a consent judgment offers several advantages for a defendant
or prospective defendant in a Section 7408 injunction action. Besides avoid-
ing the cost of litigation entry of the injunction by consent, without admitting
or denying the allegations of the Government's complaint, allows the defend-
ant the opportunity to negotiate with the Government on the scope and terms
of the Government's complaint and the terms of the final judgment to be
entered.55 For example, allegations of false or fraudulent statements which
may expose the defendant to subsequent litigation by investors, might be
deleted in favor of allegations only of gross valuation overstatement if
appropriate.5 6 The defendant or counsel may also be very interested in min-
number of injunctions entered to date under Section 7408 have been by consent of the defend-
ants. See, e.g., United States v. Hutchinson, 51 A.F.T.R. 2d 1141 (S.D. Calif. 1983) (family trust
scheme) (promoter consent without admitting or denying the allegations of the Government's
complaint); United States v. Jones, et at, 53 A.F.T.R. 2d 84-370, 83-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9741
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 1983) (family trust scheme) (promoter consent without admitting or denying
the allegations of the Government's complaint); United States v. Packaging Industries Group,
Inc., et aL, No. 83-2307-N (D. Mass. Aug. 8, 1983) (equipment leasing shelter) (promoter and
attorney consent without admitting or denying the allegations of the Government's complaint)
(consent included payment of $451,000 in § 6700 penalty); United States v. Gilbraltar Proper-
ties, Inc., et at, No. 3-83-0641 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 1983) (interest accrual real estate time-
sharing shelter) (promoter consent without admitting or denying the allegations of the Govern-
ment's complaint); United States v. Mid-American Consultants, Inc., et at, No. 83-2662 C(3)
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 23, 1983) (interest accrual real estate time-sharing shelter) (promoter consent
without admitting or denying the allegations of the Government's complaint) (consent included
payment of $38,000 in § 6700 penalty); United States v. Soundwave International, Inc., et at,
No. 84-1326-CCH (Tx) (C.D. Calif. Mar. 1, 1984) (master recording leasing shelter) (promoter
consent without admitting or denying the allegations of the Government's complaint); United
States v. Computer Alternatives, et at, No. C-84-1032 (N.D. Calif. Mar. 6, 1984) (computer
leasing shelter) (consent of promoters and salesmen without admitting or denying the allegations
of the Government's complaint) (consent included payment of $50,000 in § 6700 penalties);
United States v. Day, et at, No. C-84-563A (N.D. Ga. Mar. 20, 1984) (computer leasing shelter)
(promoter consent without admitting or denying the allegations of the Government's complaint)
(consent included $36,000 in total § 6700 penalties imposed as to two defendants, penalty
waived as to third defendant); United States v. Krupp, et at, No. 84-1327 RMT (GX) (C.D.
Calif. May 24, 1984) (leasing of master recordings) (promoter consent without admitting or
denying the allegations of the Government's complaint) (undisclosed amount of § 6700 penalties
settled by separate closing agreement).
5 See, Steinburg, supra, at 27 n. 2 See generally Rowe, Settlement of an SEC Enforcement
Action, 1980 Sec. Reg. Guide (P-H) § 1121, reprinted in Handling an SEC Investigation-1980
at 925 (No. 357 P.L.I. 1980). Settlement negotiations with the SEC leading to consent judg-
ments generally encompass the following issues: (i) discussion and provision of information con-
cerning violations to be alleged; (ii) discussion and provision of information concerning the
language and factual allegations to be contained in the complaint; (iii) ascertainment of the
language and scope of the defendant's consent (e.g., inclusion of "without admitting or denying"
phrase, exclusion of the "any other securities" phrase); (iv) ascertainment of the individuals and
entities which will or will not be named as defendants; (v) negotiation of simultaneous, compan-
ion settlements such as broker-dealer, investment advisor or 1940 Act disciplinary actions; and
(vi) coordination and determination of the content of press announcements. See Mathews, supra,
at 623-24; Rowe, supra, at 927-31. See also Marrifield, Investigations by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Bus. Law. 2583, 1626-29 (1977).
55 Cf., Rowe, supra, at 925; Arthur F. Matthews, Ed., Negotiating SEC Consent Decrees:
Targets and Tactics For Settling Civil Injunctive Actions, (Law & Business, Inc. 1979).
56 See Comments of Carolyn M. Parr, Special Counsel/Acting Chief, Office of Special Litiga-
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imizing the number of defendants name in the action.57 In the consent
process, counsel may persuade the government to name only corporate
defendants or name only those persons directly involved in promotion of
the offerings at issue and not name tax professionals potentially subject to
liability as having aided or participated in the promotion. 58 Consideration
should also be given to settling any liability for Section 6700 or Section 6701
penalties and determining the amount of such penalties. 59 The quid pro quo
for Government concessions on these points could be entry of ancillary
relief of satisfactory impact to the government and acceptable in scope to
the defendants.60
Pleadings filed in the consent judgment generally include (1) the Govern-
ment's complaint, (2) the consent of defendant(s) and (3) an order of final
judgment entering the injunction and granting ancillary relief. 61 In drafting or
proposing language for inclusion in the Government's complaint and the
court's final judgment entering the injunction, careful attention must be paid
to avoid any possibility of raising collateral estoppel against the defendant(s)
in subsequent proceedings. 62
Counsel should also consider taking steps to minimize adverse publicity
that may be created by entry of an injunction. As a matter of general prac-
tice, the Department of Justice, often in conjunction with the Internal
Revenue Service, issues a press release when it files a complaint seeking
injunctive relief under Section 7408 and when the injunction is entered.63 It
may be desirable to negotiate with the government to limit its announcement
of any injunction order or at least review with counsel the proposed language
and timing of any press announcement being contemplated in order to min-
imize adverse publicity.
tion, Tax Division, U.S. Department of Justice, at Winter Meeting of ABA Section of Taxation,
Las Vegas, Nev. (Feb. 11, 1984).
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III. Other TEFRA Tax Shelter Compliance Provisions
A. The Substantial Understatement Penalty
1. Generally
The substantial understatement penalty, Code Section 6661, imposes a
penalty on taxpayers for any understatement of tax not meeting the
exceptions specified by the statute. I The penalty applies to any understate-
ment of tax but the statutory exceptions to avoid the penalty are made
stricter in the case of understatements due to a "tax shelter", as defined by
the statute.
I SEC. 6661. SUBSTANTIAL UNDERSTATEMENT OF LIABILITY
(a) ADDITION TO TAX-If there is a substantial understatement of income tax for any
taxable year, there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 10 percent of the amount of
any underpayment attributable to such understatement.
(b) DEFINITION AND SPECIAL RULE-
(1) SUBSTANTIAL UNDERSTATEMENT-
(A) IN GENERAL-For purposes of this section, there is a substantial understate-
ment of income tax for any taxable year if the amount of the understatement for the
taxable year exceeds the greater of-
(i) 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the return for the taxable
year, or
(ii) $5,000.
(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR CORPORATIONS-In the case of a corporation other
than an S corporation or a personal holding company (as defined in section 542),
paragraph (1) shall be applied by substituting "10,000" for "$5.000"
(2) UNDERSTATEMENT-
(A) IN GENERAL-For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "Understatement"
means the excess of-
(i) the amount of the tax required to be shown on the return for the taxable
year, over
(ii) the amount of the tax imposed which is shown on the return.
(B) REDUCTION FOR UNDERSTATEMENT DUE TO POSITION OF
TAXPAYER OR DISCLOSED ITEM-The amount of the understatement under sub-
paragraph (A) shall be reduced by that portion of the understatement which is attribut-
able to-
(i) the tax treatment of any item by the taxpayer if there is or was substantial
authority for such treatment, or
(ii) any item with respect to which the relevant facts affecting the item's tax
treatment are adequately disclosed in the return or in a statement attached to the
return.
(C) SPECIAL RULES IN CASES INVOLVING TAX SHELTERS-
(i) IN GENERAL-In the case of any item attributable to a tax shelter-
(I) subparagraph (b)(ii) shall not apply, and
(II) subparagraph (B)(i) shall not apply unless (in addition to meeting the
requirements of such subparagraphs) the taxpayer reasonably believed that the tax
treatment of such item by the taxpayer was more likely than not the proper
treatment.
(ii) TAX SHELTER-For purposes of clause (i), the term "tax shelter"
means-
(I) a partnership or other entity,
(II) any investment plan or arrangement, or
(III) any other plan or arrangement.
if the principal purpose of such partnership, entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoid-
ance or evasion of Federal income tax.
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The penalty is equal to 10 percent of the underpayment of income tax
attributable to any "substantial understatement" of tax, 2 defined as any
understatement of tax due in a taxable year that exceeds the greater of $5,000
or 10 percent of the tax due.3
Prior to enactment of the substantial understatement penalty in TEFRA, a
taxpayer including a tax shelter investor could rely on "reasonable basis"
support for a disallowed position to insulate himself from any penalty for
overly aggressive positions.4 After TEFRA every taxpayer must consider the
impact of the penalty when taking an aggressive position as to tax liability
which if disallowed on audit would result in a "substantial understatement"
of tax.
The statute's safe harbor exceptions to the imposition of the penalty allow
taxpayers to assert aggressive positions which might otherwise result in
penalty if the requirements of the applicable exceptions are not met. The
statute also grants the Service authority to waive the penalty upon a showing
by the taxpayer of reasonable cause and good faith. 5 Generally, the penalty
may be avoided if there is "substantial authority" for the disallowed position
giving rise to the understatement of tax, 6 or if facts relevant to the disallowed
position were "adequately disclosed" on the tax return or in a statement
attached to the return. 7 However, in the case of a substantial understatement
attributable to "tax shelter" items a stricter standard applies. In that case the
(3) COORDINATION WITH PENALTY IMPOSED BY SECTION 6659-For pur-
poses of determining the amount of the addition to tax assessed under subsection (a), there
shall not be taken into account that portion of the substantial understatement on which a
penalty is imposed under section 6659 (relating to addition to tax in the case of valuation
overstatements).
(c) AUTHORITY TO WAIVE-The Secretary may waive all or any part of the addition to
tax provided by this section on a showing by the taxpayer that there was reasonable cause for the
understatement (or part thereof) and that the taxpayer acted in good faith.
2 The ten percent penalty is twice the 5 percent negligence penalty provided for in Code
Section 6653 or the equivalent of raising the marginal tax to 55 percent for a 50 percent tax
bracket taxpayer. See Stuart E. Siegel, New Penalty Provisions - Some Practical Considerations,
61 Taxes at 788, at 789 (Dec. 1983).
3 Code Section 6661(b) (1). For corporations other than Sub-chapter S corporations and
personal holding companies, the minimum is $10,000 instead of $5,000. Code Section 6661(b)
(1) (B).
4 The negligence penalty (5 percent of the tax underpaid) and civil fraud penalty (50 percent
of the underpayment) cannot be successfully imposed by the IRS if the taxpayer has a "reasona-
ble basis" for the claimed but disallowed deduction or credit. Code Section 6653. See, e.g.,
Durovic Y. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1364 (1970), affd 487 F. 2d 36 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 915 (1974); M. Salzman, IRS Practice and Procedure, 7-73 to 7-75 (1981). With
"reasonable basis" providing defense to any penalty coupled with the favorable interest rate on
any tax deficiency, taxpayers had little inducement to take conservative positions on their returns
or settle tax disputes with the Service if detected, and every reason to take aggressive postures.
See note Section I., supra.
5 Code Section 6661(c).
6 Code Section 6661(b) (2) (B) (i).
7 Code Section 6661(b) (2) (B) (ii). Of course, while the fact that a position is adequately
disclosed may insulate the taxpayer from the understatement penalty in the absence of substantial
authority, liability may still be imposed for negligence or civil fraud unless there is a "reasonable
basis" for the position. See note 4, supra.
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penalty is avoided only by a showing of substantial authority coupled with
the additional requirement that the taxpayer have "reasonably believed" that
the tax treatment in question was "more likely than not" the proper
treatment.8
1. Substantial Authority
While the statute itself does not define "substantial authority," the legisla-
tive history gives the following definition: "when the relevant facts and
authorities are analyzed with respect to the taxpayer's case, the weight of the
authorities that support the taxpayer's position should be substantial com-
pared with those supporting other positions."9 The legislative history and
proposed regulations both discuss what may be deemed reliable authority for
purposes of establishing "substantial authority." Such authorities include case
law, statutes, regulations and revenue rulings and exclude opinions of coun-
sel, private letter rulings issued to third parties and legal treaties.' 0
3. Adequate Disclosure
The "adequate disclosure" alternative to substantial authority is essentially
flagging a questionable position on the return for review by the Service in the
event the taxpayer's return is audited." Adequate disclosure is described as
disclosure of "facts sufficient to enable the Service to identify the potential
controversy, if it analyzed that information. '' 2 The proposed regulations set
forth specific form requirements as to what constitutes in the Service's view
acceptable "adequate disclosure" and reference should be made to those pro-
visions in attempting to formulate an adequate disclosure for purposes of
avoiding the understatement penalty. 13 However, adequate disclosure is not a
permissible safe harbor to avoid the penalty in the case of a substantial
8 Code Section 666 1(b) (2) (c). Adequate disclosure is not a safe harbor under the statute for
avoiding the penalty in the case of "tax shelter items." Code Section 6661(b) (2) (C) (i).
9 1982 Conf. Rep. 757, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 1190. See also
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-2(b) (1). The legislative history indicated that Congress settled on
"substantial authority" as the standard for the somewhat curious reason that "substantial author-
ity" had not yet been subject to interpretation in any other context. Id The author would suggest
that improving taxpayer compliance with the internal revenue laws is better pursued by enact-
ment of laws that allow taxpayers to arrange their affairs with relative certainly, rather than
relaying on interpretation of vague and unspecific standards which inevitably engender contro-
ersies between taxpayers and the Service. Compare the TEFRA amendments to Code Section
7602, REFRA Section 333 (enactment of a "bright-line" test to replace the vague and much
litigated standard for determining proper purpose of IRS summons).
10 1982 Conf. Rep. at 575; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-2(b) (2). Interestingly, the proposed
regulations do not accord a taxpayer substantial authority if the taxpayer relies on favorable case
law in his own jurisdiction when the weight of authority generally is to the contrary. Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.6661-3(b) (4) (ii).
1 See Code Section 6661(b) (2) (B) (ii). See generally, Siegel, suprai
12 1982 S. Rep. at 274.
11 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-4 (general requirements of adequate disclosure). See also Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-6(b) (2) (automatic waiver for partners in the cases of disclosure made by
partners individually as to partnership items).
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understatement attributable to a "tax shelter" item.14
4. "Tax Shelter" Understatements
A stricter standard of justification applies in the case of a substantial
understatement caused by a "tax shelter". 15 In that case, the taxpayer may
avoid the penalty only on a showing that there was both substantial authority
for the tax shelter benefits and that the taxpayer reasonably believed the
benefits were more likely than not proper.' 6
The statute defines "tax shelter" broadly. Code Section 6661(b) (2) (C) (ii)
provides:
(i) TAX SHELTER-For purposes of clause (i), the term
"tax shelter" means-
(ii) a partnership or other entity,
(iii) any investment plan or arrangement, or
(iv) any other plan or arrangement, if the principal pur-
pose of such partnership, entity, plan, or arrangement is the
avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax.
Since any plan or arrangement whose principal purpose is the avoidance or
evasion of tax constitutes a tax shelter for purposes of the penalty, the stated
definition reaches far beyond what most practitioners and laymen would con-
sider tax shelter investments. The definition would include not only limited
partnerships and other ventures which "shelter" otherwise taxable income by
creation of tax deductions and credits in excess of cash invested or income
derived,17 but also any transaction or arrangement in which the tax benefits
can be characterized as the principal purpose of the transaction or arrange-
ment exceeding any other purposes. Thus "tax shelter" for purposes of the
understatement penalty would include such transactions as corporate
reorganizations, sales of property, and charitable contributions if the under-
lying tax motivations in these transactions can be characterized as their
principal purpose. 18
14 Cf., Code Section 6661(b) (2) (C) (i) (1). 1982 S. Rep. at 274.
Is Code Section 6661(b) (2) (C). 1982 Conf. Rep. at 576.
1" Code Section 6661(b) (2) (C) (i). The proposed regulations quantify "more likely than not"
as a conclusion that "there is a greater than 50 percent likelihood that the tax treatment will be
upheld in litigation if challenged by the Internal Revenue Service." Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.6661-5(d).
17 See generally 1983 Joint Com. Staff Report, supra. Cf., Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 C.B. 43(IRS will not rule on classification of limited partnerships as partnerships for tax purposes if
aggregate deductions to be claimed by the partners over the first two years exceed the amount of
equity capital invested in the partnership). Another generally accepted definition of "tax shelter"
is that contained in Treas. Dept. Circular 230, supra.
18 See Robert B. Martin, Jr., An Analysis of the Impact of the New Tax Legislation on the Use
of Tax Shelters, 57 J. Tax. 288 (1982). Compare Slaughter, Presentation Law Repor-
ter (1984) (discussion of charitable deductions claimed by grant of conservation ease-
ments as subject to stricter "tax shelter" requirements of Code Section 6661). The proposed
regulations make reference to Code Section 269 in construing the phase "principal purpose of
tax avoidance or evasion". Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-5(b). Section 269(a) provides in general
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In any case where there has been a disallowance of a deduction or credit
for overvaluation as is often the case in tax shelter cases,' 9 the Service may
also consider imposition of the valuation overstatement penalty under Section
6659.20 However, the valuation overstatement penalty and the substantial
understatement penalty are mutually exclusive in that the Service may not
that if any person acquires control of a corporation and "the principal purpose" of such acquisi-
tion is avoidance of federal tax by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit or other allowance
which such person would otherwise not enjoy, then the Service may disallow such deduction,
credit or allowance. Reg. § 1.269-3(a) provides that: "[i]f the purpose to evade or avoid Federal
income tax exceeds in importance any other purpose, it is the principal purpose." Under Section
269, the issue of principal purpose is one of fact with the burden on the taxpayer to prove some
other principal purpose, e.g., a business purpose, other than tax avoidance. See e.g., Capril, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 162, 178 (1975); Brumley-Donaldson Company Y. Commissioner, 443
F. 2d 501 ( Cir.
The "principal purpose" test of tax shelter under Code Section 6661 is also limited in one
sense. The proposed regulations provide that a legitimate utilization of tax benefits provided
under the Code which might otherwise be characterized as a tax shelter by reference to the
principal purpose test will not be a "tax shelter" for purposes of the understatement penalty if the
tax shelter benefits are "consistent with Congressional purpose." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-5(b)
(2). For example, a plan or arrangement will not be considered to have as its principal purpose
the avoidance or evasion of federal income tax merely as a result of the following uses of tax
benefits provided by the Internal Revenue Code: the claiming of the investment tax credit under
Code Section 38; the purchase or holding of an obligation bearing interest which is excluded
from gross income under Code Section 103; entering into a safe harbor lease transaction under
Code Section 168(f) (8); taking an accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS) allowance under
Code Section 168; taking the percentage depletion allowance under Code Section 613 or Code
Section 613A; or deducting intangible drilling and development costs as expenses under Code
Section 263(c). Id.
Thus a partnership, plan, or arrangement which legitimately provides some "sheltering" of
income by reference to one of the foregoing sections would not be a "tax shelter" for purposes of
the understatement penalty. On the other hand the qualification may be a distinction without a
difference since any utilization of tax benefits "consistent with Congressional purpose" would
seem to necessarily presuppose that the tax benefits claimed are legitimate and therefore would
not be disallowed on audit and not give rise to any understatement of tax subject to the penalty.
19 See, e.g., Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, supra; Brannen v. Commissioner, supra;
Anselmo v. Commissioner, supra See Rev. Rul. 82-224, 1982-2 C.B. 5. In Revenue Ruling
82-224, a tax shelter investor was held subject to a § 6659 penalty for underpayment of tax
attributable to valuation overstatement on the ground that the cost basis of the tax shelter asset,
as stated in the shelter's promotional literature, exceeded 250% of the amount determined to be
the correct value. Relying on § 483 which deals with allocation between interest and principal of
promissory notes bearing no stated interest, the ruling arrived at the correct value by discounting
to present value the principal-only recourse indebtedness financing the asset. See i, Cf., Caruth
v. United States, 566 F. 2d 901 (5th Cir. 1978) noninterest-bearing notes on sale of property
were "indefinite" and thus not subject to valuation by use of simple discounting procedures).
20 Code Section 6659 provides:
SEC. 6659. ADDITION TO TAX IN THE CASE OF VALUATION OVERSTATE-
MENTS FOR PURPOSES OF THE INCOME TAX
(a) ADDITION TO THE TAX-IF-
(1) an individual, or
(2) a closely held corporation or a personal corporation,
has an underpayment of the tax imposed by Chapter 1 for the taxable year which is attributable
to valuation overstatement, then there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to the applica-
ble percentage of the underpayment so attributable.
(b) APPLICABLE PERCENTAGE DEFINED-For purposes of subsection (a), the appli-
cable percentage shall be determined under the following table:
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impose both penalties for the same overvaluation.21
Section 6659 is a no fault penalty in the sense that it cannot be avoided by
a showing of substantial authority, adequate disclosure or other safe harbor as
with the substantial understatement penalty though the Service has a discre-
tion to waive the penalty in cash where the taxpayer had a reasonable basis
for the valuation claimed and acted in good faith.22 It is also a more onerous
penalty rising to as much as 30% depending on the degree of overvaluation. 2a
On the other hand, the penalty is also somewhat limited in that it does not
apply in cases of property held by a taxpayer for more than five year.24
B. Aiding and Abetting Penalty
The aiding and abetting penalty was enacted by TEFRA in Code Section
67012 to provide a "civil counterpart" to the criminal aiding and abetting
If the valuation claimed is
the following percentage of The applicable
the correct valuation- percentage is:
150 percent or more but not more than 200 percent 10
More than 200 percent but not more than 250 percent 20
More than 250 percent 30
(c) VALUATION OVERSTATEMENT DEFINED-
(1) IN GENERAL-For purposes of this section, there is a valuation overstatement if
the value of the property, or the adjusted basis of any property, claimed on any return is
150percent or more of the amount determined to be the correct amount of such valuation
or adjusted basis (as the case may be).
(2) PROPERTY MUST HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED WITHIN LAST 5 YEARS-
This section shall not apply to any property which, as of the close of the taxable year for
which there is a valuation overstatement, has been held by the taxpayer for more than 5
years.
(d) UNDERPAYMENT MUST BE AT LEAST $1,000-This section shall not apply if
the underpayment for the taxable year attributable to valuation overstatements is less than
$1,000.
(e) AUTHORITY TO WAIVE-The Secretary may waive all or any part of the addition
to the tax provided by this section on a showing by the taxpayer that there was a reasonable
basis for the valuation or adjusted basis claimed on the return and that such claim was made in
good faith.
(f) OTHER DEFINITIONS-For purposes of this section-
(1) UNPERPAYMENT-The term "underpayment" has the meaning given to such
term by section 6653(c) (1).
(2) CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION-The term "closely held corporation" means
any corporation described in section 465(a) (1) (C).
(3) PERSONAL SERVICE CORPORATION-The term "personal service corpora-
tion" means any corporation which is a service organization (within the meaning of section
414(m) (3). See generally Siegel, supra
21 Code Section 6661(b) (3).
22 Code Section 6659(e).
23 It is equal to the understatement penalty (10 percent of underpayment) for any overvalua-
tion of 150 percent to 200 percent of the correct value, but rises to 20 percent for overvaluations
between 200 percent and 250 percent and 30 percent for any overvaluation in excess of 250
percent of the correct valuation. Code Section 6659(b).
24 Code Section 6659(c) (2).
25 Sec. 6701. Penalties for Aiding and Abetting Understatement of Tax Liability.
(a) Imposition of Penalty - Any person-
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statute, Code Section 7206(2).26 It provides more flexibility in the penalty
structure by enacting a penalty applicable to those who are not themselves
the taxpayer but who nonetheless assisted taxpayers in noncompliance.27 The
penalty is $1,000 or $5,000 in the case of tax liability of a corporation and is
(1) who aids or assist in, procures, or advises with respect to, the preparation or presen-
tation of any portion of a return, affidavit, claim, or other document in connection with any
matter arising under the internal revenue laws,
(2) who knows that such portion will be used in connection with any material matter
arising under the internal revenue laws, and
(3) who knows that such portion (if so used) will result in an understatement of the
liability for tax of another person,
shall pay a penalty with respect to each such document in the amount determined under
subsection (b).
(b) Amount of Penalty-
(1) IN GENERAL-Except as provided in paragraph (2), the amount of the penalty
imposed by subsection (a) shall be $1,000.
(2) CORPORATIONS-If the return, affadavit, claim, or other document relates to
the tax liability of a corporation, the amount of the penalty imposed by subsection (a) shall
be $10,000.
(3) ONLY 1 PENALTY PER PERSON PER PERIOD-If any person is subject to a
penalty under subsection (a) with respect to any document relating to any taxpayer for any
taxable period (or where there is no taxable period, any taxable event), such person shall
not be subject to an penalty under subsection (a) with respect to any other document
relating to such taxpayer for such taxable period (or event).
(c) ACTIVITIES OF SUBORDINATES-
(1) IN GENERAL-For purposes of subsection (a), the term "procures" includes-
(A) ordering (or otherwise causing) a subordinate to do an act, and
(B) knowing of, and not attempting to prevent, participation by a subordinate in an
act.
(2) SUBORDINATE-For purposes of paragraph (I), the term "Subordinate" means
any other person (whether or not a director, officer, employee, or agent of the taxpayer
involved) over whose activities the person has direction, supervision, or control.
(d) TAXPAYER NOT REQUIRED TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE-Subsection (a) shall
apply whether or not the understatement is with the knowledge or consent of the persons autho-
rized or required to present the return, affadavit, claim, or other document.
(e) CERTAIN ACTIONS NOT TREATED AS AID OR ASSISTANCE-For purposes
of subsection (a) (1), a person furnishing typing, reproducing, or other mechanical assistance
with respect to a document shall not be treated as having aided or assisted in the preparation of
such document by reason of such assistance.
(f) PENALTY IN ADDITION TO OTHER PENALTIES-
(1) IN GENERAL-Except as provided by paragraph (2), the penalty imposed by this
section shall be in addition to any other penalty provided by law.
(2) COORDINATION WITH RETURN PREPARER PENALTIES-No penalty
shall be assessed under subsection (a) or (b) of section 6694 on any person with respect to
any document for which a penalty is assessed on such person under subsection (a).
26 1982 S. Rep. at 275. Under the criminal statute it is a felony punishable by imprisonment or
fine (up to $100,000) for any person to willfully aid, assist, procure, counsel or advise as to the
preparation of a false or fraudulent return, affidavit, claim or other document under the internal
revenue laws. Code Section 7206(2). See, e.g., United States y. Crum, 529 F. 2d 1380 (9th Cir.
1972); United States v. Williams, 644 F. 2d 696 (8th Cir. 1981).
27 1982 S. Rep. at 275. Prior to enactment of Code Section 6701, the only civil penalty
applicable to third parties were the penalties under Section 6694 providing penalties applicable
to tax return "preparers". Since the penalties are concurrent in scope as to return preparers, the
penalty under Section 6701 may not be applied to any preparer who has been assessed a penalty
under Section 6694. Code Section 6701(f) (2).
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contested in federal district court in accordance with the provisions of Code
Section 6703.2
The penalty applies to "any person who aids or assists in, procures, or
advises with respect to, the preparation or presentation of any portion of a
return, affidavit, claim or other document in connection with any matter
arising under the internal revenue law. ' 29 Thus, the penalty would reach
advisors such as attorneys, accountants and appraisers who prepare valuation
reports for use in determining a taxpayer's tax liability.30
On the other hand, the penalty is limited in application by the require-
ments that the person charged with aiding and abetting (1) "actually know"
that the document as to which he advised or aided in preparation will be
used in connection with a material matter under the internal revenue laws,
and (2) "actually know" that the subject document, if used, will result in the
understatement of tax.3' However, note that a third-party advisor who may
escape liability for penalty under Section 6701 because of the scienter
requirement may nonetheless be subject to the abusive tax shelter promoter
penalty under Section 6700.32
The Tax Reform Act of 1984 amended Code Section 7408 to make con-
duct subject to penalty under Section 6701 a ground for injunction under
Section 7408.33 The amendment was intended to make clear that actionable
conduct for purposes of injunctive relief under Section 7408 should not be
limited to only acts during the organization and sale phase of an abusive tax
shelter but should include actions by the promoter after the organization and
sale as well (E.G., filing false partnership returns). 34 The legislative history
points out that the amendment to include Section 6701 as actionable conduct
under Section 7408 should not be viewed as restricting the scope of 7408 to
"promoter activities alone". 35 By including within the scope of actionable
conduct under Section 7408 aiding and abetting under Section 6701 the
amendment expands the scope of Section 7408 beyond the promoters and
others who directly make or furnish actionable statements for purposes of
6700 to include those who indirectly participate by aiding and abetting in the
28 Code Section 6701(b). See Code Section 6703. Section II A. (5], supra.
29 Code Section 6701(a) (1).
30 See Joint Com. Explanation, at 221. Moreover, the penalty is not limited in application to
only assistance in filing a return. Rather, it reaches assistance in connection with "any matter
arising under the internal revenue laws." It therefore could be construed to reach assistance to
a taxpayer rendered in the audit process or in litigation. Id.
31 1982 J. Com. Explanation at 220. See Code Section 6701(a) (2).
32 Under Code Section 6700 anyone assisting in the organization or sale of "any plan or
arrangement" who makes or furnishes one of the two types of prohibited statements would be
liable for the penalty. See Section [I. A., supra. The false or fraudulent statement under Section
6700 requires only proof that the person have "reason to know" rather than actual knowledge as
required under Section 6701, and there is no requirement of knowledge as to a gross valuation
overstatement under Section 6700. See Section ,supra.
33 Tax Reform Act of 1984 § 143.
34 1984 Sen. Rep. at 434-435; 1984 Conf. Rep. at 227.
35 1984 Conf. Rep. at 227.
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abusive tax shelter.3 6 Indeed, the inclusion of Section 6701 conduct in Sec-
tion 7408 expands the scope of injunctive relief under Section 7408 to reach
any conduct resulting in understatement of tax whether or not related to a
"tax shelter".37
On the other hand, this amendment may be of limited effect given the
strict scienter requirement under Section 6701.38 With the burden of proof on
the government to establish actual knowledge, liability under Section 6701
will be in many cases difficult to establish where reliance on others or other
defenses can be demonstrated to negate knowledge or specific intent.39
36 IdCompare the scope of liability under Section 6700 discussed above at Section II. A. [4]
[a].
37 Id. Cf., Code Section 7407 (injunction authority for abusive activities of return preparers).
See United States Y. Ernst & Whinney, F. 2d (11th Cir. 1984).
38 See J. Con. Explanation at 220. Code Section 6701(a) (2).
39 Compare Section 6700. The false or fraudulent statement under Section 6700 requires only
proof that the person have "reason to know" rather than actual knowledge as required under
Section 6701, and there is no requirement of knowledge as to a gross valuation overstatement
under Section 6700. See Section II. A. [4J [a], suprm
